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COMPONENTS OF PROOF IN LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS
HUBERT W. SMITH t
CERTAIN problems in law stand up stoutly against attack but yet lure
the audacious to storm ramparts which never can be fully captured.
Anong these is the problem of proof, that inner citadel which lies behind
tie. outposts of the law of evidence.
Do these outer barricades protect or have they become doubtful sym-
bols in the desert? To judge of this, or to gain access to the citadel
of final conviction, whether under a plaintiff's flag or a defendant's
standard, one must be aware of the approaches which lead inward from
the alien world of doubt and disputation. It is the limited purpose of
this paper to explore the several approaches which lead to that ultimate
state of conviction which we call proof.
The approaches to proof are not confined to well-labeled high roads
of factual evidence. They include pathways among preco nceptions, and
avenues through psychological, logical, legal, factual and scientific ma-
terials. If it were possible by subtle means to dissect the final state of
conviction produced in the mind of a trier of facts, one might hope
to say in the particular case what pathway persuasion had actually
travelled. The proponent of the issue may have deployed his forces
along the several approaches, as indeed he should, so that in retrospect
one may be hard put to say which attack broke the barrier of skepticism
or breached the defenses of doubt.
Let us look briefly at the terrain through which these approaches wind.
We shall remember that each pathway to proof is but one component
of a diversified attack upon the guarded mind of the trier of fact which,
after all, is the citadel of final proof to which we first alluded.
I. THE COMPONENT OF PRECONCEPTION
Preconceptions may color what the witness sees, what the auditor hears,
how the advocate proceeds, how judges rule or in what way triers of
t.Associate in Medico-Legal Research, Harvard Law Schol and Harvard Medical
School. A.B. (1927), I.B.A. (1931), University of Texas; L.L.B., Harvard Law School
1930; M.D., Harvard Medical School, 1941.
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fact react to proofs. Justice stigmatizes them and science holds them
suspect, rules of court are designed to repress them and counsel seek
in examining a panel to strike every prospective juror who has pre-
conceptions, mental or emotional, inimical to his side of the case, Yet
these residual attitudes, derived from a myriad of unspecified sources,
are so much a part of us all, that extirpation is not possible and reason-
able control is difficult. I doubt if one can characterize the complex
matrix of ideas, superstitions, prejudices, emotions, and the like with
any precision. It is hardly feasible to set off these a priori materials
which modify proof by drawing a sharp line of demarcation separating
them from similar factors noticed later under the "psychological" coul-
ponent. Under "preconceptions" one may include fixed notions, attitudes
or emotional reactions acquired prior to the particular litigation. By
contrast, one may use the "psychological component" of proof to specify
more focal problems generated by the immediate case such as capacities
of witnesses for accurate observation and recollection and reactions in
the trier of fact produced by trial stimuli.'
1. The following illustrations may serve as typical examples of the intelnded dis-
tinction between remotely acquired preconceptions' and immediately generated psycho-
logical stimuli:
a. Prconccplions. In a series of district court negligence cases arising front traffic
accidents, plaintiff -was approaching the intersection from the left but, under doctrines
elaborated by appellate courts and applicable to circumstances of the collision, this was
no legal bar to recovery. The trial judge would have entered verdict for the plahitiff
but the jury found for defendant. In doing so they determined fault by the simple rule
of the traffic court long known to the jurors, that the person approaching an intersec-
tion from the right has the right of way. UL.MAx, A JUDGE TAKES TIe STAND (1933) 20.
Judge Ulman points out that juries also ignore the rule that contributory negligence,
however slight, is a bar to plaintiff's recovery, and give effect to equitable preconcep-
tions by adjusting the size of their verdicts in keeping with the comparative negligence
of the parties. Id. at 31 c scq.
b. Psychological Stimuli. Chafee has shown how psychology engendered by the
last war caused relaxation of standards of proof. Indictments and convictions under the
Espionage Act resulted where the evidence was too flimsy to prove the offense charged.
Noteworthy was the case of Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919), a prosecu-
tion under the Espionage Amendment of 1918. Defendants were convicted and sentececd
to twenty years imprisonment for distributing circulars agitating against the Govern-
ment's policy in despatching an expedition to North Russia in the sunmer of 1918. The
judgment was affirmed by a 7-2 opinion of the Supreme Court, Holhes and Braudeis
dissenting. Professor Chafee feels that there was no adequate proof of "intention to pro-
duce curtailment of munitions", or of "intention to interfere with the war with Ger-
many", these being necessary ingredients of the Government's case.
"The trial judge ignored the fundamental issues of fact, took charge of the cross-
examination of the prisoners and allowed the jury to convict them for their Russiall
sympathies and their anarchistic views. The maximum sentence available agahist a for-
midable pro-German plot was meted out by him to the silly, futile circulars of ive ob-
scure and isolated young aliens, misguided by their loyalty to their endangered coul-
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Preconceptions cover the whole scale from naive belief in social fictions
to bigoted belief in various prejudices, racial, economic, religious or
political. They span the half formulated philosophy of the man in the
street who in living by his dim lights has criteria for mental decision
as truly as a Spinoza whose introspective system is more logical, sym-
metrical and complete. These preconceptions include ethical considera-
tions and the fusion of many mores and concepts of righteousness to
produce a sense of decency. Combine the common impulses of twelve
men to make a decent disposition of the dispute at hand and one ha,;
the so-called philosophy of the "square deal", which I take it is the most
crucial orientator and determinant of jury deliberations and verdicts.
So far as one can ascertain from the Apology of Socrates, which
Plato wrote some time after his master's death, the great philosopher
was not even technically guilty of violating any positive law of the city
of Athens. He was selected as a likely political scapegoat and in his
trial one finds the deficit of proof made good by appeals to the preju-
dices of jurors. The charge leveled at him was that of corrupting the
youth and worshipping strange gods. Athens traditionally was a city
of free speech, where philosophers and sophists were at liberty to speak
their minds, even to the extent of saying that there was no Zeus, and
that the function of "higher education," as taught to the young, was
to enable them to "make the worse appear the better reason." Socrates
himself scrupulously observed all the forms respected by good citizens.
But the prosecutors pointed out that he frequently expressed himself
monotheistically and such circumstances were so incongruous with pre-
conceptions of a majority of the jurors that he was put to death.
In the time of Galileo (1564-1642), tradition had associated the
astronomy of Ptolemy and the physics of Aristotle with Christianity,
and an attack upon one was deemed an assault upon the other, just as
in the twentieth century the Fundamentalists have come to associate
special creation with Christianity, so that we find such things as laws
against teaching the thedry of evolution. Galileo adopted the Copernigan
system and he discovered novae, the phases of Venus, the moons of
Jupiter, and sun spots, all of which were inconsistent with the geocentric
solar system'and location by dogma of definite places for heaven and
hell. As a result of the so-called first trial in 1616, actually an informal
try and ideals who hatched their wild scheme in a garret, and carried it out in a
cellar.
"... The lesson of United States v'. Abrans is that Congress alone can effectively
safeguard minority opinion in times of exciteinent. Once a sedition statute is on the
books, bad tendency becomes the test of criminality. Trial judges will be found to adopt
a free construction of the act so as to reach objectionable doctrines, and the Supreme
Court, will probably be unable to afford relief." CHAFEE, FaEE SPEECH IN; Vi Unur
STATES (1941) 139-40. For a discussion of the Abrans case, see id. at 10340.
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investigation, Cardinal Bellarmine exacted a promise from Galileo that
he would not hold to, teach, or defend the Copernican system recently
declared heretical. In 1632 Galileo came into direct conflict with papal
preconceptions when he published his Dialogues of the Two Principal
Systems of the World, the Ptolemaic and Copernican. Here he made
two of the interlocutors able spokesmen in defense of the Copernican
system while a third, aptly named Simplicius, feebly supported the
Ptolemaic astronomy. The authorities rejected the statement of Galileo
that these were merely hypotheses, stopped the sale of the book, and
appointed a commission of theologians which entered these findings:
(1) That the imprimatur was put on the book without permission.
(2) That the Ptolemaic system was defended in the dialogue by a
simpleton and inadequately in any event.
(3) That Galileo deviated from hypothesis to make express state-
ments.
(4) That he broke the Papal injunction of 1616.
The second trial before the Inquisition was clearly colored by pre-
conceptions of the triers of fact. It stretched from April 12, 1633, to
June 22, 1633, the Dialogue was finally burned, and Galileo was im-
prisoned. In addition, he was compelled to make a formal recantation
in the most humiliating terms, an interesting example of an effort to
"torture" testimony to make it lend support to preconceived conceptions
of the trier of fact.2
In the witchcraft cases tried in Old and New England in the last
sixty years of the seventeenth century, we have more recent examples
of preconceptions affording the foundation for proof of guilt. In cases
where witnesses of one race are customarily disbelieved in social defer-
ence to another, we have a current instance. One of the vices of the
general verdict system which encouraged the procedural ref 9 rm of special
issues was the ease with which jurors could use their verdict as a legal
means of expressing extra-legal preconceptions.
2. See MAcDONELL, HISTORICAL TRIALS (1927) 109-28.
3. KITTREDGE, WITCHCRAFT IN OLD AND NEW ENGLAND (1929) 3: "There was a
famous witch-trial at Exeter, England, in 1682. Roger North was present, and here is
his account of the state of public opinion: "'The women were very old, decrepit, and
impotent, and were brought to the assizes with as much noise and fury of the rabble
against them as could be shewed on any occasion. The stories of their arts were in every-
one's mouth, and they were not content to belie them in the country, but even in the city
where they were to be tried miracles weie fathered upon them, as that the judge's coach
was fixed upon the castle bridge, and the like. All which the country believed, and ac-
cordingly persecuted the wretched old creatures. A less zeal in a city or kingdom bath
been the overture of defection or revolution, and if these Women had been acquitted, it
was thought that the country people would have committed some disorder.'"
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Not long ago Dr. Bourne, an eminent British medical man, openly
violated prohibitions of the criminal law by aborting a fifteen-year-old
unmarried girl, pregnant as the result of rape.4 Preconceptions about the
propriety of medical interference had a most interesting result both on
court and jury. The trial judge, in summing up, started with the accepted
legal premise that abortion was justifiable under the controlling statuten
"for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother." But he charged
the jury in such a manner as to make preservation of life synonymous
with protection of the girl's health against the nervous shock of an
unwanted birth and made it clear that the jurors should not look upon
the case as it would one involving the professional abortionist.' This
latitude was quite broad enough for the jurors to apply their own pre-
conceptions and they returned a verdict of not guilty.
The strategy of Clarence Darrow in more than one celebrated case
depended upon converting the limited issue of guilt into a broader social
issue or even a class struggle in which jurors were made either partici-
pants, or champions of an oppressed class of which the defendant was
but a symbol. In the Woodworker's Conspiracy case, a prosecution
arising out of a labor controversy, he charged the complaining witness
with being the unindicted criminal for exploiting labor, stigmatized the
prosecution as "an assignment by the District Attorney of the State
of Wisconsin to George MN. Paine," brought in collateral issues regarding
the benighted economic philosophy announced by Senator Hammond of
South Carolina in 1857, and called upon the jury to "render a verdict
in this case which will be a milestone in the history of the world and
an inspiration to the dumb, despairing millions whose fate is in your
hands." '
4. Rex. v. Bourne, 3 All E. R. 615 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1938).
5. Offenses against The Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vicr., c. 100, § 16.
6. "The case here is very different. A man of the highest skill, openly, in one of
our great hospitals, performs the operation. Whether it was legal or illegal you ,ill have
to determine, but he performs the operation as an act of charity, without fee or reward,
and unquestionably believing that he was doing the right thing, and that he ought, in the
performance of his duty as a member of a profession devoted to the alleviation of human
suffering, to do it. That is the case you have to try." By somewhat strained analogies,
the court went on to imply that conjectural shortening of life by the nervous sequelac of
unvanted pregnancy would warrant medical interruption of pregnancy on the ground of
"preserving the life of the mother." Rex. v. Bourne, 3 All E. R. 615, 616 (Cent. Crim.
Ct. 1938).
7. STONE, CLArE.CNE D.%ROW FOR THE DEFENSE (1941) 112: "The jury brought
in a verdict of 'not guilty'; with the weight of the centuries on their shoulders they could
do no less." At another place (p. 166) Stone says: "Rarely did he attempt to convert
the courtroom merely to the innocence of his client; rather lie converted them to a mel-
low and tolerant philosophy of life in which all mankind was innocent as charged. Before
long opposing attorneys, witnesses, jurymen and judges were sweating in a glow of broth-
erly love."
1942]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Arado has given us varied illustrations of verdicts determined by
preconceptions or collateral psychological factors in his accounts of
criminal trials in Chicago courts.' Reid was convinced that "a religious
and ethical system may conflict daily with common sense (that is, evi-
dence) and yet persist for a hundred generations."' Schmeing's experi-
mental investigations showed that certain farmers of lower Saxony are
so susceptible to spiritualistic and occult manifestations, hallucinations,
"second sig.t" and premonitions, that the pronounced eidetic ability
renders it difficult to obtain objective statements from them in court."
Moore expressed the opinion that all testimony is modified by cultural
patterns." Datta took issue with Montague's assertion that testinony
is neither an ultimate nor an independent source of knowledge. Ile felt
that testimony does provide information even though extrinsic proof,
such as an independent inference or perception, may be needed to verify
its truth.la Eliasberg, I think, overstated an assumption partially true
when he declared that "testimony is primarily a function of the com-
mands of the group, brought to bear on the person testifying." ' a In any
event we may be sure that the judicial process rarely escapes the imu-
pingement of preconception though the impact on proof in any case
may or may not be prejudicial to justice.
Allusions have previously been made to the philosophy of the "square
deal" as a touchstone of jurors and an ever present concern of the trial
lawyer in formulating his case. The willingness of jurors to credit testi-
mony or to enter a fact-finding upon it is conditioned in an important
way by their desire to do equity between the parties. It is a fact well
known to trial lawyers that one's position is immeasureably strengthened
if his client's position can be formulated in equitable terms. It is ex-
tremely interesting that jurors of whatever stratum or station, and of
whatever level of life morally and mentally, share a common impulse
to use the verdict as an instrument for achieving their notions of a
8. Arado, Vignettes of the Crininal Court (1932-41) J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLON',
vols. 23, 25, 26, 27, 30 and 31 (for page references see indices of individual volumes).
9. Reid, Memory (1922) 109 NATURE 551-52.
10. Schmeing, Justin und Eidetik (1937) 28 MONATSSCIHRIFT FOR Kiu,:INAI.I'SV-
CHOLOGIE UND STRAFRECHTSREFORM, 113.
11. "The cultural pattern and its pervasive control of human values can be disre-
garded in testimony no more than in other lines of social phenomena and interaction.
Social values determine facts quite as much as they are in turn determined by them.
Probably no social group has the insight to differentiate between fact and current cul-
tural fiction." Moore, Elements of Error in Testimony (1935) 19 J. oF APLz. PSYCUOL.
447.
12. Datta, Testimony as a Method of Knowledge (1927) 36 MIND 354-58. See MON-
TAGUE, THE WAYS OF KNOwING (1925).
13. Eliasberg, Zur Psychologie des Aussagenden nud Schwirenden Zen gen (1930)
35 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ANGEWANrTE PsYcHoLoGiz 353,
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"square deal." This application of the "golden rule" in jury rooms bypersons who rarely observe it in the outer world may represent ,an
interesting example of identification of the trier of fact with the party
thought to have been wronged. Again, it may sometimes represent ego
preservation seeking expression through a verdict that other members
of the community will approve and applaud. What constitutes a "square
deal" varies according to the place, the time, the parties and the jurors
in the box, and sometimes it depends more on what whittlers on the
court house square may think than upon dictums found in books of
ethics. The "square deal" philosophy has exceptional weight if it chances
to parallel independent sympathy reactions. These latter usually aid a
plaintiff rather than a defendant and a corporation less than an indi-
vidual. No one can feel sorry for a poor corporation whose home office
is in New York City.'
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPONENT OF PROOF
A. SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY: STUDIES OF ACTIVITIES INVOLVED IN
PROOF MAKING
We have learned much and will profit even further from experimental
studies of psychological activities such as perception, recognition, dis-
crimination, interest, recollection and the effect of all sorts of direct
and collateral modifiers of accurate observation and reporting. The
illustrious Hans Gross was a lawyer, but he left a deep imprint on
scientific proof and indeed has been proclaimed the "father of scientific
14. Once, after the writer lost some large fire insurance cases in whichli he e:lvzetc.
to establish the defense of arson, the clerk of court congratulated him on the cvnduct of
the litigation and sought to pour on the balm of consolation. "A defendants" lie said,
"has not won a fire insurance case in this county in thirteen years, so you need not feel
badly. Down here people regard a fire insurance policy as a promissory note V hich
becomes due and payable when the fire occurs." On another occasion it .,as liussible
by a happier formulation of the psychology of the dispute to escape defeat. This was a
case which at the outset seemed hopeless in that a woman with two children was law-
ing" X, her divorced husband, to establish rights in valuable property. This lady litigant
had married a second time and her new husband was in court. The distribution uf the
property turned upon facts to be found by the jury and it seemed likely that in such a
contest between a woman and a man the jury's sympathy reactions would be too purer-
ful to overcome. It was possible to change the complexion of the litigation in a legitimate
manner not foreign to certain issues, by showing that the second husband of the plaintiff
was eager to have and to hold the property in question but vas quite disinclined t,
assume parental responsibilities toward the plaintiff's two minor children. His posi-
tion became grasping and avaricious in the eyes of the jury. They took tle %iew that he
was trying to sit on the nest the first husband had made. They shrank from awarding a
verdict to so callous a person as the second husband and promptly returned fact ilil4-
ings supporting a judgment for X.
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criminology."'" In his classic work on criminal investigation,U Dr.
Gross wrote with acumen and insight upon the frailty of human ob-
servation and showed how all the senses at times may give false reports
of external events. We identify things by impressions or patterns rather
than by detailed criteria and may confuse analogous patterns. Even
perception often involves undisclosed inferences which may be erroneous
and so lead to visual or auditory conclusions ranging from mere inac-
curacy to sheer illusion. Transference may occur, as in the case where
stage scenery is so arranged by placing actual stones and trees in the
foreground that the observer imputes reality to the entire panorama.
Early in the century psychologists pounced upon the staged melee or
confusion drama as an experimental means of studying these inaccura-
cies.' 7 These showed that Sir Walter Raleigh's disturbance over varying
spectator accounts of the affray outside the tower was a concern to be
shared by courts and lawyers.'8 Professor von Liszt, the criminologist,
ushered in these seances by a drama staged at the University Seminary
in Berlin, involving an apparently genuine quarrel between two students
in which blows were exchanged and a revolver fired. The spectators
wrote accounts of what transpired and descriptions showed from 26%
to 80% of erroneous statements. Exclamations were attributed to silent
spectators, various actions were fictitiously imputed to participants, and
many observers failed to recollect essential features of the transaction."'
Individual powers of observation are infinitely variable and on the
whole undependable. On February 25, 1910, at the Union Club in Boston,
George G. Crocker and three companions put on a short skit involving
a brokerage transaction. Each of seventeen observers wrote down his
version of what occurred. Two crucial facts were involved: first, the
order as repeated by the broker differed from the order as given, and
second, a pocket book was stolen. No one of the witnesses reported the
happenings correctly and their several versions showed numerous inac-
curacies and discrepancies. -0 Such infirmities of observation and recol-
15. Born in Graz, Austria, in 1847, Gross qualified for law in 1869, served as
"Untersuchungsrichter" (examining magistrate) of the Criminal Court at Czernovitz,
Austria, and became Professor of Criminal Law in the University of Graz in 1905.
16. GRoss, HANDBUCH FOR UNTERSVCIIUNGSRICIITER, ALS SYSTEI DER KRIMINAL-
ISTIK (2 vols. 1893), translated into eight foreign languages; in English under the title,
CRIUMINAL INVESTIGATION, A PRACTICAL TEXTBOOK FOR MAGISTRATES, POLICE OFFICERS
AND LAWYERS (by John Adam and J.,Collyer Adam; 3d ed. edited by Norman Kendal,
1934).
17. See VAN GENNEP, LA FORMATION DES LfGENDES (1905) 158-59 (experinent
before the Congress of Psychologists).
18. See Mfoore, Elements of Error in Testimony (1935) 19 J. OF APPL. PsvCIIOL.
447, 458.
19. Hugo Miinsterberg, Professor of Psychology at Harvard, recounted many va-
riations of such experiments in his book, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908).
20. See CROCKER, A TEST OF THE ACCURACY OF THE TESTIMONY OF B°-STANDmEs
(pamphlet in the Harvard Law Library, 1912).
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lection account for many appalling conflicts of testimony which we are
prone to set down to intellectual dishonesty, self interest, prejudice or
pure sympathy reactions. - '
Psychological experiments done in exploring testimonial defects have
been imitative of the original prototypes. There are limits to what can
be learned by this method and difficulties in maintaining proper scientific
controls. There has been a relative paucity of studies terminating hi
pragmatic techniques and practical suggestions. Perhaps this is because
mechanics of jury trial militate against successful employment of many
psychological techniques. It may be that Miinsterberg's caustic criticisms
of law for failure to use the psychologist have been followed by resigned
timidity. Among studies calculated to have legal utility we may notice
Feingold's work at Harvard on the processes of Recognition and Dis-
crimination 2 2 from which he concluded among other things that:
(1) "Recognitive ability varies inversely as the degree of similarity.
(5) "The objects must reach at least 25% similarity before they
can have a confusing effect on the process of recognition.
(8) "It is more difficult to recognize an identical object in a totally
different setting from the one in which it was originally seen than
in the same setting, the ratio of difficulty being about as 27:1.
(9) "It is more difficult to recognize an identical item in a new
setting than a totally different item in the setting previously experi-
enced, the ratio of difficulty being about as 12:1.
(10) "Recognitive ability varies inversely as the number of objects
perceived - time being constant.
(11) "Recognitive ability varies inversely as the number of objects
exposed- time being proportionate and not more than one second
per object."
Feingold suggested the desirability of determining issues of unfair com-
petition in trade-mark violation and "passing off" cases by psychological
tests of the actual confusion created by the supposed simulation. Desai
gathered evidence tending to show that surprise partially arrests the
motor activity in which the subject is engaged and that the surprising
stimulus tends to become focal at the expense of existing processes,
21. See ARNOLD, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED To LEGAL EVIDENCE AND OruER CO:sTLc-
TIONS OF LAW (2d ed. 1913). See also BuRT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY (1931); Grnjss, CnIntI:;,L
PSYCHOLOGY (translated from the 4th German ed. 1911); McCAan', PSYCHOLOGY IV',
THE LAWYER (1929) ; ROBiNSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935). In connection with
expert testimony, see OSBORx, THE PROBLE31 OF PMF (2d ed. 192o) and Osviani, ThE
MIND OF THE JUROR AS JUDGE OF THE FACTS; OR, THE LAYIANsS VIEw oF THE LAw
(1937).
22. Feingold, Rccognition and Discrimination (1915) 18 PsycHoL. .1ONmtAI'HS
No. 2.
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whether cognitive, emotional or conative.2 ' Lucas and Murphy presented
one hundred mixed advertisements, fifty from the current issue and fifty
from the forthcoming issue of a large, general magazine to regular
readers of that journal, and found that up to 50% of the group inter-
viewed falsely remembered seeing certain of the unpublished ads in
print.-4 Moore wrote an interesting article devoted to the psychological
factors which may impair testimony.
20
In 1905 Binet and Simon brought out the precursor of our modern
intelligence tests. Properly applied, these tests constitute important aux-
iliary modes for gaining scientific insight into certain personality 4factors
such as individual capacity and aptitude. The original test was a stand-
ardized interview containing a number of questions and problems. The
test and its many modifications aim to replace guesswork "sizing up"
of subjects by a uniform comparative measure of the tested qualities.
These, together with psychometric tests of all descriptions, now help the
psychiatrist and the social worker verify the intellectual endowment of
individuals they must study. Would it be feasible to use I.Q.'s (intel-
ligence quotients) to rate testimonial qualifications? An I.Q. of 70 or
less suggests feeble-mindedness or even severer mental impairment. But
an I.Q. of 150 affords no adequate basis for assuming that X is a better
witness than Y who has a recorded I.Q. of 140. Too many qualifying
factors affect reliability of testimony for us to allow small superiorities
to govern relative credibility. It might be of interest to know that a
witness had an I.Q. of a moron, but whether the law can or will make
proper use of such information must depend upon more refined devel-
opment of trial mechanisms than those which now obtain. It is now
feasible to determine whether a particular individual excels in visual or
auditory observation."0 Thus a witness may be highly trustworthy as
regards conversation, but quite inaccurate as to written material lie has
23. Desai, Surprisc, a Historical and Expcrinicntal Stdy (1939) 7 BRTsu J. or"
PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH1 SuPP. No. 22.
24. Lucas & Murphy, False Identification of Adverlisentis in Recognilion Tests
(1939) 23 J. oF APPL. PSYCHOL. 264.
25. Moore, Elements of Error in Tcslinony (1935) 19 J. ov Ari'.. Psvciol,. 447.
He touched upon the following very pertinent considerations: (1) the cultural definition
(inability to differentiate between fact and current social fiction) ; (2) stereotypes (ten-
dency to replace "certain variant aspects of experience with features or qualities more
in keeping with a pattern which we have come to accept") ; (3) suggestion in the' court
room; (4) suggestion outside the court room; (5) conditions of observation; (6) de-
grees of attention; (7) relative efficiency of visual and auditory observation; (8) dis-
traction; (9) complexity of matters observed (as affecting attention brought to bear);
and (10) participation by the witness ("while proximity to the incident and even par-
ticipation in it may reduce accuracy for complicated or emotion-producing action, kines-
thetic response usually aids instead of deterring accurate recall").
26. See id. at 454.
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read.2 7 Such criteria may yet come to fruitful application in our judicial
system of tomorrow.
Gordon, in 1924, showed that in discrimination of test weights the
average judgment becomes more valid as the number of participating
-judges increases. Estimates by two hundred subjects of a test weight
yielded an average judgment in perfect agreement with the independent
criterion, namely, the actual weight used.2s Eysenck's experiments led
him to conclude that a similar relation obtains between judgments of
beauty or affective value, and the number of judges used. He found
that if rankings of twelve pictures by 700 people were adopted as a
standard, the judgments of 200 test individuals correlated perfectly with
the standard ratings.2- Inasmuch as there was no interaction of opinion,
such experiments afford no psychological proof of the superiority of
group judgments. They demonstrate an interesting effect of the law of
averages when one applies the statistical method to a large enough group
to permit errors of overstatement to cancel or balance errors of under-
estimation. When we shift to jury deliberations, we are dealing with
smaller numbers, and a social interaction enters in. One cannot escape
the sway of positive leadership and the fact that strong convictions of
aggressive members tend to override weaker opinions of more indifferent
jurors. Some evidence exists that deliberation and discussion tend to
make a group judgment superior to the opinion of the average partici-
pant,30 but it is doubtful whether jury verdicts can be considered as at
all subject to any "averaging" out of error by statistical principles opera-
tive in the foregoing experiments.
The possible effect of interest on a witness is fairly well appreciated
even by lay jurors. An honest watchman swore in a criminal case that
he had locked a gate. There was positive proof to the contrary. It
was so much a duty of the watchman to lock the gate that his mind
rebelled at the idea that he had been derelict.
On the side of the trier of fact, the most crucial psyclwlogical principle,
I think, is that each of us tends to judge in the light of his own past.
To a varying degree, each trier of fact introduces into the process of
weighing and interpreting evidence a subjective component based upon
27. See Dallenbach, Two Pronounced Cases of 1'erbal Imagery (1927) 38 Ar J.
oF PsYcaoL 667-69.
28. See Gordon, Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted eIVghts (1924) 7 J. Exr.
PsYcHaoiL 398400.
29. Eysenck, The Validity of Jud,3icnts as a Fusction of the Ntm!,er of Judges
(1939) 5 J. Ex,. PsycHoI. 650.
30. See Bechterew, Die Ergebuisse des Experiments aul darn Gebicle dcr holkch-
tiven Reflexologie (1924) 24 ZEITScHRIFT FUR ANGtEWAN-T'E PSYCOLUME 305; Shaw,
A Comparison of lndiz,iduals and Small Groups hi the Rational Sottioni of Com plex
Problems (1932) 44 Am. J. PSYCHoL. 491; Watson, Do Groups Thih: More Eleicnt3ly
than Individuals? (1928) 23 J. A:n,. & Soc. PsYctoL. 328.
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personal experience, beliefs, and conceptions of what things are likely
or probable in light of the current social order as he sees it:
"The King of Siam gave credence to every thing which a Eu-
ropean ambassador told him, as to the circumstances and conditions
of Europe, until he came to acquaint him, that the rivers and sea
were occasionally made so hard, by the cold, that people could walk
on them; but this story he totally disbelieved and rejected, as entirely
repugnant to every thing which he had either seen or heard; and the
ground of his disbelief was perfectly rational." 3'
Another fact of signal importance, is that different triers of fact require
different amounts and kinds of proof in order to be convinced. A WPA
worker might be partial to lay evidence in situations where a blue ribbon
juror with a college degree might give controlling weight to scientific
testimony. It is also a fact to be noted that members of a jury panel
may have dissimilar notions of what is an adequate performance of the
task of proof making.32
B. GARDEN VARIETY PSYCHOLOGY: EVERY DAY REACTIONS OF -IUMAN
BEINGS WHICH MAY AFFECT THE PROCESS OF PROOF MAKING
a. Fear-flight Reactions. Proof is of no value unless it is available
at the moment of trial. Thus maintaining control of one's source of
evidence is of crucial importance.
Example: X was an officer of a fraternal insurance order and in
collecting premiums became acquainted with the signatures of mem-
31. ANONYMOUS, THE THEORY OF PRESUMPTIVE PROOF; OR, AN INQ"UIRY INTO TInF
NATURE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (1815) 15. "A similar principle sways our belief
in respect to the acts of individuals, as arising in the society and period in which we live.
We always refer the credibility of the case to what has fallen within our own observa-
tion and experience of men and things. We readily give credence to acts of comunon
occurrence, and are slow in yielding our assent to the existence of new and unlooked for
events. When a wretch, at no distant period, in affluent circumstances, was accused of
having stolen some sheets of paper in a shop, tile judges admitted him to bail against
evidence, because the charge was altogether unlikely in one of his condition in life. From
these instances, we may safely infer that the principles for our believing or disbeliev-
ing any fact are rather governed by the manners and habits of society, than by any posi-
tive law. The writers on the general law of evidence, such as Mascardus and Menolius,
have accordingly declared that all proof is arbitrary, and depends on the feelings of the
judges." Ibid.
32. An Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, and an American, all learned men and
pleasant dinner companions, agreed to write a scholarly book on the elephant for their
reunion one year thence. When the occasion arrived, the Frenchman entered with a
slender volume of verses bound in red morocco entitled The Elephant, My Love; the
Englishman carried a tome entitled The Elephgut and the British Empire; the American
had a book jacketed in a multi-colored wrapper labeled, The Elephants in Barnum and
Bailey's Circus; and the German, with apologies, presented Volume I of a projected tell
volume series, this initial installment being titled: Elephant: (Angulate Mammal, Gen-
us Elephas), Vol. 1, The Process of Gestation and Reproduction.
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bers, including that of . After P died, leaving a large estate, an
unnatural testamentary disposition of his property was attacked as
a forgery. X was interviewed by contestant and it became evident
that she could give valuable support to the contention that the
alleged testamentary signature of Y was spurious. Her statement
was taken. On the eve of the trial she fled to an unknown place.
Due to emotional lability she was excessively frightened by the
prospect of going to court and this indisposition was furthered by
the fact that her testimony would put her in conflict with other
members of the fraternal insurance order who were being called
by proponent of the will to prove the authenticity of Y's signature.
Her loss did not prove fatal to contestant's proof of the defense of
forgery, but it well might have done so. There was a tactical error
in failing to reassure the witness and if need be put her under
subpoena so that her appearance in court could have been justified
in her mind as compulsory rather than elective. As she later
declared, she did not desire to appear voluntarily to testify in oppo-
sition to her friends even though she had a steadfast conviction as
to the facts.
b. The Combat Complex or the "Righter of Wrongs." This type of
witness never gets out of pocket, is the unpaid partner of the trial
lawyer and helps him find and organize evidence.
Example: X was a roomer in the house of 1'. P's wife and
daughter filed affidavits of lunacy charging that Y was non compos
mentis and had indulged in conduct which was irrational, bizarre
and sometimes dangerous. X took up the cudgels for Y although he
was no special friend of Y and by so doing would invite certain
publicity unfavorable to himself and his business. X %was always
at the lawyer's office when wanted and at the court house half an
hour early. He helped to unearth a surprising chain of verifiable
contradictory evidence which totally destroyed the strongly fabri-
cated case of those who almost succeeded in having Y committed.
c. The Case of Reconstructed Recollection. That one has committed
witnesses to signed statements as to how an accident or how a transaction
occurred, does not necessarily mean that such persons will duplicate'this
version by testimony on the trial. Change of position often occurs where
the statement is contrary to the sympathies of the witness or tie in-
vestigator indulges phrases favorable to his side of the case in recording
the account for the speaker to read and sign. One also may see a change
of position where witnesses are not contacted regularly and reformulate
their recollections before trial to correspond with unconscious partiality
or a desire to aid the opposite litigant.
Example: X was driving a truck along a country road and was
temporarily on the left hand side throwing a paper to a farm house.
Servants of Y coming from the opposite direction in a produce
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truck going at an excessive rate of speed, failed to avail themselves
of the means at hand with safety to themselves to avert a collision
after discovering X's position of peril. X was critically injured in
the collision and was unconscious for three days. During this time
Y's insurance carrier, Z, through its claim agents, pinned down ,l
of the eye witnesses to the transaction on signed statements favor-
ably worded to absolve Y from negligence. Y and Z refused to settle
and failed to maintain contact with the witnesses. In the meantime
X's lawyer found that the true facts were not quite as Z's investi-
gators had related in the statements signed by the credulous farm
hands. These witnesses saw the error of their statements and when
called to the stand by Y and Z, testified for X, although at no time
was any undue pressure exerted upon them or untoward suggestions
made as to what their testimony should be.
d. Psychological Imponderables. In the trial of all cases the lawyer
comes up against potent influences which bear directly on proof making
and the final state of conviction but yet lie beyond the periplery of legal
objection. These unspecified and variable factors are like magic arrows
against which the armor of the law affords incomplete and uncertain
protection. It is not feasible here to pick up more than a few of these
random darts for cursory examination.
(1) Psychological Imponderables in Dealing with Jury: Appraisal
of Jury Psychology and Responsiveness to Various Formulations and
Appeals. An appreciation of how the average human being reacts to
testimony in the light of current mores and prejudices is one of the
most valuable weapons of the trial lawyer under a system where less
promising members of the general populace are used as triers of fact
in all types of cases. Ordinary law cases are decided upon the law as
given by the court and the evidence introduced upon the trial. For that
reason it is held improper and prejudicial argument if a counsel seeks
to establish conviction of the existence of facts favorable to himself by
inviting the jurors to consider facts which are outside the record.a
Yet every trial lawyer knows that very real influences in the making
of p 'oof are brought to bear by methods both benign and reprehensible
which evade proper challenge and timely objection in the course of trial.
These we may call collectively "psychological imponderables." Daily,
cases are won or lost on the mere countenance of counsel, for an "affi-
davit face" can add substantial weight to the proof of an otherwise un-
promising claim. No greater example of this magic influence for good
33. The rule is to prevent counsel from giving unsworn evidence not subject to
cross-examination. The making of fact assertions foreign to record evidence is improper
argument to the jury. If the conduct is materially prejudicial it suffices to reverse judg-
ment provided the affected party takes such objection as local practice lav requires to
preserve the error.
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or bad upon the argument of the case can be cited than the well-known
and almost inescapable power which Rufus Choate exerted over jurors
by his personal conduct and demeanor.34
It might even be said that court room manners are to some extent
dictated by the psychology of trial and the type of guests one has in
the jury box. Great sincerity and honesty of purpose probably have no
substitutes, but there is also room for subtlety and finesse in addressing
one's efforts to the psychology of the triers of fact. That some lawyers
recognize this delicate truth and that others ignore it accounts for many
differences in the success of counsel in comparative litigation. This
psychology, not about the willingness of food-starved or sex-starved
mice to cross an intervening charged runway to get satisfaction on the
other side, but in relation to human reactions to trivial things, plays an
imponderable but not inconsequential part in the successful making of
proof.
It is a naive assumption to think that a trial law\yer can invoke every
objection to evidence recognized as legally valid. The jury reaction to
the perennial objector is unfavorable. Oftentimes an impression is
created that counsel is shutting out light from the case and preventing
the jurors from gettirig the full facts. Psychological imponderables thus
act as a partial veto on full application of rules of evidence. It is a mark
of the advocate to know the limited occasions when his case is best served
by vigorous objection. The graciousness with which one objects influ-
ences the frequency with which he may do so without creating antag-
onism.
Jurors may respond favorably to a show of excessive brilliance, and
this is the rationale which underlies the practice of some defendant
lawyers in examining a jury panel to address each prospective juror
by his name without looking at the jury list. This depends upon com-
mitting to memory the name of every juror as he is being examined by
the plaintiff's attorney and such a feat often makes a deep impression
on the jurors before the actual trial is even begun.3 ' On the other hand,
a diametrically opposite approach is one which depends upon the sym-
34. -"... we do know, from those who heard and saw him, that he was the mnst
persuasive of speakers, with a power over an indifferent or hostile jury which has heen
compared to the fascination of a bird by a snake. This was what lie loved. 'No gam-
bler,' wrote Senator Hoar, 'ever hankered for the feverish delight of the gaming table
as Choate did for that absorbing game, half chance, half skill, where twelve human dice
must all turn up together one way, or there is no victory.' Something of an actor he
must have been, and most of what he did.-his smiles, his asides, his apparently careless
gestures,--was done consciously, for the effect which it would produce on the jury."
FuEss, RirFus CHOATE, THE WIZARD OF THE LAw (1928) 171.
35. Probably the jury reaction runs thus: Lawyer X is obviously a brilliant fellov.;
smart men do not waste time on cases that have no bottom; ergo, X's connection with
the case is pretty good evidence that there is suund substance to his client's position.
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pathy of the average man for the underdog. Jurors subconsciously try
to balance the scales and their sympathies go out to the inexperienced
lawyer in his effort to cope with a veteran antagonist. For this reason
an alert young trial lawyer. often has an advantage over his elder op-
ponent.
30
(2) Psychological Imponderables in Use of Pleadings. Counsel has
the right to read his pleadings or to make an opening statement at the start
of a case to apprise the jurors of his position and what he will seek to
prove. Pleadings are not evidence, except so far as offered for admis-
sions contained therein, but in arriving at a verdict, jurors are often
unable to separate recollections based on evidence from those based on
reading of pleadings." Indeed, a preconception equivalent to half-proof
is sometimes established by this adroit, extra-legal use of pleadings. In
a case of conspiracy to defraud, in which two lawyers among others
were sought to be implicated as co-conspirators, the plaintiff pleaded that
the nefarious agreement was made in building X. The building had a
bad reputation and, scarcely a month before, a lawyer had cut his client's
throat there in a dispute over a $5.00 fee. The episode had received
newspaper notoriety and members of the jury were prepared to believe
that if murder was done by lawyers in building X, it was a likely place
for mere conspiracies to be hatched. No possible exception to the plead-
ings could reach the allegation.
Again, we sometimes see pleadings used for inflammatory purposes
to aggravate damages. A motion to strike may be ineffectual where,
as in wrongful autopsy cases, a plaintiff alleges acts were done wantonly
and maliciously. The heat of these allegations, directed to arousing
further the jurors' antipathies to body dissection and to getting full
pecuniary advantage of historical taboos, far exceeds any fire actually
in the case, for in most instances the autopsies were made for scientific
reasons but without technical consent. The gravamen in these cases is
not personal injury to a dead body, but interference with quasi-property
rights of the next of kin to have possession of the undisturbed body for
purposes of burial. The measure of damages is based on mental stiffering
36. The writer learned this truth of trial practice from one who employed it with
surprising success. Actually he was a man of remarkable attainments and a strategist
second to none. I doubt if there were very many trial lawyers against whoni lie came
in his early days who had a sounder command of the legal bearings of the litigation. Far
from being ostentatious, he so conducted himself that one might well imagine lie was
at a great disadvantage in coping with his older opponents and before the case had pro-
gressed far, the jury was unconsciously helping him to fight an uphill battle.
37. If counsel confines his preliminary statement to facts admissible in relation to
the litigation, trial courts are slow to hold that failure to support the statement by evi-
dence is reversible error. It is said that evidence may reasonably fall short of bona fide
expectations entertained at the start of trial. See cases collected in Note (1939) 118
A. L. R. 543.
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and injury to the feelings. Thus the standard is subjective rather than
objective and punitive damages may well be awarded for technical tres-
passes unaccompanied by any actual wanton disregard or malice on the
part of the examining physician.
For instance, in Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Burion, S the in-
surance company was sued by next of kin for unauthorized autopsy done
under written consent to discover whether decedent actually died frosm
a compensable cause. Plaintiffs repudiated the consent, claiming that
it was obtained by fraud subsequent to the autopsy and in a trial to a
jury recovered a verdict for $2,500. In affirming judgment for plaintiff,
the appeal court held that the trial judge did not err in refusing defend-
ant's motion to strike certain allegations as redundant, prejudicial and
inflammatory. These were as follows:
"... said surgeons and doctors, acting as the agents, woorkmen
and employees and representatives of said defendants, with large
steel knives, steel saws, steel pliers and steel instruments of various
kinds, cut, sawed, mutilated, lacerated and opened the dead body
of the plaintiff's said husband, removing therefrom the stomach,
bowels, heart, lungs, arteries, and other organs, which were cut into,
lacerated, and mutilated by said surgeons and doctors working for
said defendants, at defendant's special instance and request, all
without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff," and ". . . by
reason of the horrible and gruesome cutting, laceration, mutilation,
tearing, and sawing of the flesh, veins, heart, lungs, and other vital
organs of her said husband, the memory of which is continuously
in her mind, haunting her every move and action," etc.3m
Medical men know that the usual post-mortem examination is not a
profanation of the dead, but a surgical opening of the body in a routine
manner to discover the cause of death by scientific means; it need not.
and rarely does, disfigure the body for burial. Yet the imaginative jury
is licensed to believe that the doctors tore the body asunder like so many
vultures in a ghoulish crime against decency and the dead.40 The appellate
court looked for legal license rather than foir prospect of prejudice, anti
upheld the pleading in these words:
"It is never reversible error to refuse to strike out parts of the
complaint unless its nature is so impertinent that it reflects on char-
38. 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N. E. (2d) 360 (19381).
39. Id. at 578-79, 12 N. E. (2d) at 361.
40. Indeed, degradation, abuse and mutilation seem in st-,me quarters to be a part
of the judicial conception of autopsy. In upholding a %%ife's right to recover feir an tun-
authorized post-mortem examination of her husband, htudy d,,ne at Bellevue He,pital,
Patterson, J., said in Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551, 555, 37 X. Y. Supp. 471, 474
(1st Dep't 1896): "The right is to the possession of the corrpse in the same conditi,,n
it was in when death supervened. It is the right to what remains vwhen the breath leaves
the body, and not merely to such a hacked, hewed and mutilated corpse as so,4me stranger,
an offender against the criminal law, may choose to turn over to an afflicted relative."
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acter or is scandalous, and we do not believe, in view of the general
allegations of the complaint as a whole, [that the autopsy was
wrongful, unlawful and wilful] that it operated to prejudice the
appellant."'4
1
(3) Psychological Imponderables in Conduct of Court and Counsel.
A trial judge may show his distaste for one side of a case in such a
manner as to control the locus of jury conviction.
The Federal Constitution preserves to federal courts the right to make
fair comment on the evidence, since this was a prerogative of trial judges
at common law. In a noteworthy line of decisions of which Quercia v.
United States42 is illustrative, the Supreme Court has condemned as
prejudicial error any use 'of the power of comment to add to or distort
evidence, or to give purely personal inference or conjecture the unwar-
ranted garb of fact and thus to "render vain the privilege of the accused
to testify in his own behalf." The Quercia case involved a prosecution
for alleged violation of the Narcotic Act, and the trial judge charged
the jury:
"And now I am going to tell you what I think of the defendant's
testimony. You may have noticed, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen,
that he wiped his hands during his testimony. It is rather a curious
thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying. Why it
should be so we don't know, but that is the fact. I think that every
single word that man said, except when he agreed with the Govern-
ment's testimony, was a lie."
Chief Justice Hughes wrote an opinion reversing the conviction. He
held that the trial court had not indulged mere dissection and analysis
of evidence for guidance of the jury, but had so far transgressed bounds
of fair comment that the prejudice was not cured by the trial court's
further charge:
"Now, that opinion is an opinion of evidence and is not binding
on you, and if you don't agree with it, it is your duty to find him
not guilty."1
43
41. For other wrongful autopsy cases based on similar inflammatory pleadings, see
Patrick v. Employers Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 251, 118 S. W. (2d) 116
(1938) (verdict: $1,500 actual, $6,000 punitive, damages) ; Coty v. Baughman, 50 S. D.
372, 210 N. W. 348 (1926) (verdict $1,500) ; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Blackmon, 3 Ga.
App. 80, 59 S. E. 341 (1907); Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 Ill. App. 644 (1901); Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Love, 132 Tex. 280, 121 S. W. (2d) 986 (1938), aff'g 99 S.
W. (2d) 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
42. 289 U. S. 466 (1933).
43. Even so, fair comment has such a powerful influence on proof making that
plaintiffs suing in state courts often dismiss petitions seeking large damages of foreign
defendants and refile for less than $3,000 to circumvent imminent removal of the cause
to the federal courts on the jurisdictional ground of diversity of citizenship.
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Judicial comment on the weight and credibility of evidence is usually
forbidden to state courts by local practice acts. Whatever the rule as
to comment, such prejudice as taints proscribed remarks will usually
appear from the recorded utterance and the ordinary exception and assignt-
ment-of error afford a reasonably satisfactory mode for securing review
by the appeal court. Beyond these borderline cases lies a further group
where the prejudice may be as real but more difficult to rectord. The
trial judge may throw a psychological weight into the scales byi his atti-
tude or demeanor. He may assume an air of indifference by reading
a paper during examinations by one counsel, or make correct rulings on
evidence in an angry voice or one so embellished by gestures or facial
grimaces as to indicate a distaste for one side of the case. It is difficult
to get the prejudice of such conduct into the record for the reason that
verbal or subjective reactions cannot always be discovered from the typed
version of trial court proceedings. Bystanders' bills and affidavits of
counsel are not ideally suited to their preservation. Appeal courts prob-
ably realize that various spectators might place different interpretations
on the trial court's judicial demeanor. Possibly they dread opening a
door for reversals which might swing wide and often on the hinges of
counsel's imagination. These practical reasons may account for the fact
that courts inveigh against improper conduct of this subtle sort, but
shrink from declaring it such prejudicial error, standing alone, as will
warrant reversing a judgment. Some opinions rest on the ground that
bad mamers of the trial court do not tender a fit subject for appellate
review if the action complained of does not disclose an independent mis-
take of law.44 In other opinions the trial judge is verbally chastized for
bad manners or warned in abstract language, but the judgment in the
particular case is affirmed for professed want of any demunstrable preju-
dice from the conduct. 45 Some courts openly profess a disinclination to
44. Lewis v. Crenshaw, 47 Cal. App. 781, 191 P. 72 (1920) (contract action: judg-
ment for defendant affirmed: laconic, decisive and extremely brief rulings, disconcert-
ing to counsel, not prejudicial if legally correct); Todd v. Boston Elevated Ry., 20S
Mass. 505, 94 N. E. 683 (1911) (tort action: judgment for defendant affirmed: tone
of voice of presiding judge is not subject to exception unless some error of law is com-
mitted); Beal v. Lowell Ry., 157 Mass. 444, 32 N. E. 653 (1892) (judgment for
defendant affirmed: tone of charge); Briffitt v. Wisconsin, 58 Wis. 39, io N. W. 39
(1883) (criminal action: judgmtnt for state affirmed: peculiar manner and language
of trial judge in making correct rulings gives them force and is commendable. ". . . the
only question for this court is whether such rulings were correct as matters of law.
His manners we have nothing to do with. That is a matter entirely personal except
when expressing error.").
45. Hickey v. Webster County, 148 Iowa 337, 127 X. W. 65S (19101 (tort action:
plaintiff appealed from small judgment in his favor which he thought inadequate. Af-
firmed. That court read those instructions favorable to defendant imlressively and
effectively, and perceptibly lowered his voice in reading those favorable to plaintiff,
even if properly raised in motion for new trial, would not prove harmful effect: ". . . If,
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broaden their burdens of review by looking into the subtleties of trial
court decorum with hypercritical (or even critical) eye.4" In the few
instances where appeal courts have remanded causes as well as rebuked
the trial judge for improper demeanor, it is usually a fact that another
ground is primarily relied upon. The opinion may even offer an apologia
and express assurances that the court would not have been inclined to
reverse the judgment of the lower court on conduct alone.47 To preserve
therefore, it appeared as a fact in this record that the trial judge did at any stage in the
reading of his instructions, 'perceptibly lower his tone of voice,' it must be manifest to
counsel upon further reflection that we would be quite helpless to determine from such
fact whether appellant was hurt or helped by such modulation.") ; Vaughn v. May, 9
S. W. (2d) 156 (Mo. App. 1928) (tort action for slander: judgment for plaintiff
affirmed: comments involved, but dictum as to conduct); Egan v. United Ry. of St.
Louis, 227 S. W. 126 (Mo. App. 1921) (tort action: judgment for defendant affirmed) ;
Banks v. Empire Dist. Electric Co., 4 S. W. (2d) 875 (Mo. App. 1928) (tort action:
judgment for plaintiff affirmed: comments manifesting impatience of judge over duration
of examination and declaration that court had another case to try did not constitute preju-
dicial error) ; Settle v. Crawford, 155 Okla. 291, 9 P. (2d) 38 (1932) (replevin action:
judgment for defendant affirmed: error assigned to comments on ground that "they
reflected upon plaintiff"; also conduct not fully described; held no apparent prejudice).
See Ott v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 276 Mass. 566, 177 N. E. 542 (1931)
(Board's decree cancelling physician's license for professional misconduct reversed for
want of fair hearing where Board members went beyond impatience, discourtesy or
bad manners to indulge sarcastic affronts to petitioner's counsel and thus prevented his
making a reasonable cross-examination).
46. Hickey v. Webster County, 148 Iowa 337, 127 N. W. 658 (1910) (as to the
complaint of "lowered voice," the appeal court said: "It may be proper to suggest here
that the burdens of this court will be greatly multiplied, if not magnified, if it must as-
sume the responsibility of controlling the elocutionary taste and judgment of the trial
courts."); Fuller v. Johnson, 80 Conn. 493, 68 Atd. 977 (1908) (contract action: judg-
ment for defendant affirmed. Error assigned: addressing plaintiff as "this mani" and
defendant as "Mr. Johnson" in such a way as to slur plaintiff and prejudice jury against
him. Held: "The off-hand remarks of a trial judge in announcing an interlocutory rul-
ing are not the proper subject of such minute and verbal criticism."); Empire Oil &
Refining Co. v. Fields, 188 Okla. 666, 112 P. (2d) 395 (1940) (tort action: judgment
for plaintiff affirmed: heated exchanges between court and defendant's counsel marked
by clear judicial hostility. ". . . mere decisiveness or abruptness of manner is not
necessarily objectionable, nor is impatience, discourtesy, or bad manners, provided the
essentials of sound judicial conduct are not violated, and complaint cannot ordilarily
be made of the tone of voic used by the judge, unless some actual error is committed."
Rehearing denied, January 7, 1941).
47. Kribs v. Jefferson City Light, Heat & Power' Co., 215 S. W. 762 (Mo. App.
1919) (tort action: judgment for plaintiff reversed on another ground); Nash v. Fi-
delity Fire Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 672, 146 S. E. 726, 63 A. L. R. 101, 107 (1929) (contract
action: judgment for plaintiff reversed: overinterrogation by court of defendant's wit-
ness. "If reversal depended entirely upon this assignment, we would not likely consider
it sufficient, but, taken in connection with other clear errors, it but stresses the conclu-
sion that defendant has not had a fair trial.") ; Kinney v. Town of West Union, 79 W.
Va. 463, 91 S. E. 260 (1917) (judgment for plaintiff reversed: "undue activity" of
presiding judge apparently involving over-lengthy questioning of jurors in such way as
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his assignment of error to a demeanor objected to as prejudicial, counsel
must tender his bill of exceptions for approval and allowance by the
trial judge,4" and thus the official impugned paradoxically judges his
own conduct and by qualifying the bill may neutralize it. The lesson
of these cases is that counsel will not profit by inviting belligerency of
the court and must learn to conmmand the respect and consideration which
most courts uniformly extend.4"
Presence and conduct of bystanders may exert a collateral effect on
proofmaking and yet leave the fact of prejudice so mooted and specu-
lative that no successful objection can be made. In Chicago Jincthin
Railway Company v. McGrath, a death action against a carrier for negli-
gence, while judge and counsel had withdrawn to argue a motion, one
of plaintiff's witnesses said to the jury that he hoped they would do
the square thing by the widow and give her a substantial verdict. No
connection was shown with the plaintiff. The appeal court held that a
new trial was properly denied."0
to indicate court's view of the case. In reversing, appeal court indicates it probably
would not have done so had the conduct been the oknly error in the case) ; Saw' yer v.
Brown, 108 Okla. 265, 236 P. 404 (1925) (judgment for plaintiff reversed: error in
excluding evidence plus prejudicial attitude and demeanor of trial judge in presence
of jurors). (Mr. Paul Ryan, a student in the Harvard Law School, assisted in devel-
oping authorities on "angry voice").
48. Chicago City Ry. v. Anderson, 193 I11. 9, 01 N. E. 499 (1901).
49. "And if you look at the life of that distinguished ornament of the Northern
Circuit later known as Lord Abinger, you will find refirence is made to an occasion
on the Circuit when with all the usual formalities he wvas congratulated at Grand Court
because of a machine which it was alleged he had invented. The machine was said to U":
kept out of sight, but it was such that it caused thQ Judge before whm he vas ap-
pearing to move his head in a particular way indicating agreement with all that Scarlett
said. In his memoir Scarlett thus explains his machine: 'My machine, however, con-
sisted in nothing more than to study to avoid laying down any propusitions that w ere
not evident, and that could not be supported by plausible argumnent; to make no mis-
statement or exaggeration of the facts, and, above all, not to combat %%ith warmth any
matter advanced by the Judge, nor indued to oppose at all but %,here I vas satisfied I
could alter his opinion by the most inoffensive reasoning.' Ubserve hib care not to
quarrel with the Court, and not to fall foul of a Judge unnecessarily." Si:;a.uL-ro:, Cot.-
DUCT AT THE BAR AND SOME PROBLEMS OF A'riocAc (1933) 28-.29.
50. 203 Ill. 511, 68 N. E. 69 (1903) (two grounds: (1) Defendant failed to object
until after verdict whereas trial court's timely instruction to disregard would have
erased effect. (2) Error was harmless because witness merely reiterated sympathies
for widow manifest from his testimony and by his conduct probably impaired rather
than aided the effect of his evidence). The difficulty here %%as that cuunsel %Ws not
wanting in diligence because the episode occurred during his legitimate absence frin the
room, and the assumption that the error was harmless involved pure speculation.
See also Bias v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 46 NV. Va. 349, 33 S. E. 240 t 1S99) (action for
negligently running over and killing eighteen-month-old child who had wandered onto
right of way. During jury view sheriff took small red dress worn by deceased child
at time of injury and placed it on a stick eighteen inches high thrust into the roadbed
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Counsel may face the jury rather than the box in examining witnesses
and by facial gestures interpose unspoken side-bar remarks on the testi-
mony. In retrospective examination of the cases of Clarence Darrow,
one sees how often the question of guilt became incidental to the issue of
class struggle, or to the theme that man is a cork tossed willy-nilly and
not the master of his fate as Henley suggested. Rules against improper
argument have multiplied, and since either party on appeal may suffer
reversal for their infringement, they have a curbing influence in civil
litigation." Even here the gentle reprimand of the judge may not dis-
at the point on the railroad track where the accident occurred. The purpose was to
test the distance at which the child should have become visible to the engineer, but it
should be noted that conditions were not comparable enough to make the experineut
valid for the jurors made their view in the daytime while walking whereas the engineer's
view was at night from the cab of a rapidly moving locomotive. Held: not sufficient
misconduct to require discharge of jury, or to set aside verdict in view of court's
cautioning jury to disregard).
It will be appreciated that these and similar cases raise a series of important ques-
tions: (1) Is an instruction to disregard actually effective in erasing the itpressionl
made on the jury by extraneous incidents? (2) Should the primary test be diligence of
counsel, or should it be an inherent duty of the trial judge to act to the end of pro-
tecting proof making from collateral appeals? (3) Should the fact that the incident
wa§ spontaneous or innocent and not inspired by counsel or litigants make the elisode
harmless error or should the probable effect be the test?
51. The law proscribes all varieties of inflammatory, emotional and collateral ap-
peals calculated to prejudice unbiased exercise of the fact finding function. Whether dill-
gent objection at the time is required to preserve the error varies with the case and with
local law. The usual test is whether or not the argument was so flagrant that the trial
court's instruction to disregard would have been ineffectual to erase the prejudicial effect
from the jurors' minds.
Among the varied instances of improper argument held to be so prejudicial as to
require reversal of the judgment obtained in the trial court, we may notice the follow-
ing: Moss v. Sanger, 75 Tex. 321, 12 S. W. 619 (1889) (racial prejudice: plaintiff
attacked as a swindling and defrauding Jew) ; Ogodziski v. Gara, 173 Wis. 3h1, 181 N.
W. 227 (1921) (religious prejudicc: plaintiff argued that all witnesses for the defense
were Catholics and subservient to their priests) ; People v. Rosa, 275 P. 961 (Cal. App.
1929) (political prejudice: prosecutor in arson case made prejudicial allusions to de-
fendant's affiliations with IWW); Smith v. Jennings, 121 Mich. 393, 80 N. W. 230
(1899) (sectional prejudice: defendants attacked as Shylocks front another state who
robbed local workingmen) ; Secor v. Heyman, 123 Misc. 168, 205 N. Y. Supp. 348 (Sup,
Ct. 1924) (prejudice against Wall Strcet: in action by stockbroker it was prejudicial
for customer's counsel to argue: "There is many a man sitting on the benches in the
park because he lost his money down in Wall Street"); Fair v. State, 1W8 Ga. 409, 148
S. E. 144 (1929) (prejudicial allusion to prevalence of crime: appeal to tile jury by
solicitor general to convict defendant of murder because statistics showed that Georgia
had 561 murders in 1922); Zemliansky v. United Parcel Service, 175 Misc. 829, 24 N. Y
S. (2d) 672 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (unwarranted aspersions against witnesses: respectable
physician who testified for defendant was characterized as "the greatest and most un-
mitigated rotten liar I have ever seen and a tool of the defendants") ; McColluin Ex-
ploration Co. v. Reaugh, 146 S. W. (2d) 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (wealth of de-
fendant corporation: argument that corporation with capital stock of $500,000 should
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abuse the jury's mind of inflammatory or prejudicial utterances, and a
firmer policy both in levying fines for contempt and declaring mistrials
is needed in some quarters.
In criminal cases where the state has no appeal, defendant's counsel
is often able to bring in collateral issues and innuendoes, particularly in
state courts, and to indulge prejudicial argument and side-bar remarks
with only such restriction as judicial reprimand may impose. The state,
as in the Hauptmiann case, may be favored by "trial in the press" or
the pressure of public opinion on jurors, but an assignment of error that
the case was made into a "legal circus" to the prejudice of the accused
may not avail the convicted defendant. 
2
(4) Psychological Imponderables and the Appeal Court. We often
hear lawyers say in regard to a case which they have lost on appeal:
"It's a nice opinion, but it isn't about my case." Appeal courts are
subject to unspecified motivations. In some cases it appears that the
decision is reached first by involved mental operations or on equitable
grounds, and a suitable opinion then constructed to support it. A par-
ticular decision may involve a choice between competing premises. What
initial premise the court chooses may well hinge on private preconcep-
tions prevalent in that tribunal regarding such subjects as justice in the
particular litigation, the proper means and ends of jurisprudence, eco-
nomic postulates, equitable considerations and the proper ordering of the
social system. The legal reasons given in the opinion can hardly be
pay more exemplary damages than a poor defendant); West Texas Utilities Co. v. Ren-
ner, 53 S. W. (2d) 451 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932) (appeal to emotion and sympathy: "Tap,
tap, tap" of plaintiff's wooden leg contrasted with easy, quiet life of company officials).
The wide range of improper argument requires the trial practitioner to mster its
ramifications and to be acquainted with all the pertinent decisions in his particular juris-
diction.
52. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N. J. Law 412, 180 Ati. 809 (1935). See, however,
State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940) : Large throngs attended trial for
manifest purpose of expressing public sentiment that woman accused of murder should
be hanged rather than given life imprisonment. There was prejudicial pre-trial in news-
papers. The trial judge permitted one hundred and fifty spectators to cro%%d inside the
rail. The audience indulged in vocal expressions and outcries without proper judicial
reprimand. Certain spectators made hanging motions w ith their hands. A conviction of
murder was reversed on the ground that fair trial had been defeated by these unre-
strained collateral appeals directed to the jurors. The court properly substituted "prob-
able prejudice" as tested by judicial inference for proof of "actual prejudice'" by the
offended party.
Guarantee of an impartial judicial atmosphere in the court rtoWn should be an auto-
matic right and not a privilege contingent on showing actual prejudice from the e\tra-
neous interference. "Furthermore, the question of what effect the misconduct and the
demonstrations of the bystanders and spectators had on the jurors is for the court t-i
decide and not for members of the jury to pass upon, for a juror is competent to show
misconduct but not how that influence operated on his mind." 196 id. at 256, 193 So.
at 922.
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expected to yield clear disclosure of these deeper motivations. To say
this is not to condemn courts but to re-echo an empirical fact now so
well recognized as to be truism rather than mere iconoclasm. It explains
the shifting content of substantive law concepts which as a matrix have
an effect in specifying requirements of proof. Thus terms such as
"police power," "freedom of contract," "in restraint of trade" and the
like go on acquiring new meanings from one era to another, for defi-
nitions change with the "definers" though the words to which they
attach remain the same."
Courts may stretch the doctrine of judicial notice too far in supplying
evidence for a decision which would find no factual foundation in the
record. In other cases, particularly where the factual evidence tran-
scribed and sent up to the appeal tribunal from the trial court is long
and complicated, there may be an unconscious reorientation of the oper-
ative facts. Green has shown that "the net-work of theory increases in
complexity with the multiplicity of data" and that this enlarges the
chance that facts will be grouped improperly to bolster tip a particular
theory which the appeal court would like to make controlling. 4 Glueck
thinks that if trial judges in criminal cases were required by rules of
court to file opinions setting out the grounds and motivations for im-
posing one sentence rather than another, this visible record would stimu-
late ratiocination and lead to a more critical and scientific consideration
of the reasonable grounds of action in individual cases.
One should not infer that the impact of psychological imponderables
has any uniform or even closely predictable effect on the making of proof.
But probably so long as mere men are involved in the judicial process,
such factors will operate, and bear some causal relation to the final state
of conviction. Certainly a glimpse far into the past shows employment
of these collateral appeals in proof making. Quintilian openly espoused
the use of psychological imponderables in every manner possible as a
natural and legitimate part of the art of persuasion." The Athenians
53. Mr. Justice Holmes said: "A word is but the skin of a living thought." See
Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454, for a discussion of factors which
have entered into judicial interpretation of "freedom of contract." And see Powcll, The
Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law (1918) 15 J. PIL., PSYCXOL. & Scl. Mg1r'-
oDs 645. Mr. Powell's thesis is that "the logic of constitutional law is the common sense
of the Supreme Court of the United States." He points out that the judicial process
as seen in constitutional law operates through the judgment of individuals.
54. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) 25 el seq.
55. Personal communication.
56. "Both parties as a general rule may likewise employ the appeal to the emotions,
but they will appeal to different emotions and the defender will employ such appeals with
greater frequency and fulness. For the accuser has to rouse the judge, while the de-
fender has to soften him ... Appeals to pity should, however, always be brief, and
there is good reason for the .saying that nothing dries so quickly as tears .... And if
we spend too much time over such portrayal our hearer grows weary of his tears, takes
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are said to have forbidden appeals to the emotions"T after Hyperides'
defense of Phryne, but this injunction seems to have been applied only
in cases tried before the Areopagus," s and appeals for pity were common
in ordinary courts of Athens in the fourth century.
III. THE LOGICAL COMPONENT IN PROOF MAKING
Division of reasoning into inductive and deductive modes and stress-
ing of formal logic afford no guarantee of sound proof making. These
exercises truly may whet ratiocinative powers of the advocate and
sharpen his ability to assess validity of inferences. But as some one well
said, a man may become so sharp that he cuts himself. At the outset
we may indulge a few miscellaneous comments on the role of logic.
Logic deals with inferences which may be drawn from premises, true
or false, while lawyers are primarily concerned with proving the premises
or underlying primary facts. It was Sir James Mackintosh who re-
marked, "Men fall into a thousand errors by reasoning from false
premises to fift, they make from wrong inferences from premises they
employ." The reasoning process depends upon detecting similarities and
differences and in estimating probabilities. It is of primary importance
that one should not draw inferences from a fact until it has been proved.
It is too much to expect that jurors or witnesses will ever apply formal
logic to proof, for the average man is not likely to take up the study
of metaphysics in replacement of the evening radio, bingo or horse-
racing preoccupations. Again, in the words of Laplace, "How can you
frame a mathematical formula when you are dealing with passions,
personal interests, and complicated circumstances?" The growing com-
plexity of life requires more and more that we rest on the verities asserted
by others which practical expediency forces us to accept without oppor-
a breathing space, and returns once more to the rational attitude from %%hich he has Iieki
distracted by the impulse of the moment.
"Actions as well as words may be employed to move the court to tears. Hence the
custom of bringing accused persons into court wearing squalid and unkempt attire, and
of introducing their children and parents, and it is with this in view that we see blol-
stained swords, fragments of bone taken from the wound, and garments spotted with
blood, displayed by the accusers, wounds stripped of their dressings, and scourged bodies
bared to view. The impression produced by such exhibitions is generally enormuus, since
they seem to bring the spectators face to face with the cru'l facts. . . . Still I would
not for this reason go so far as to approve a practice of which I have read, and which
indeed I have occasionally witnessed, of bringing into court a picture of the crime painted
on wood or canvas, that the judge might be stirred to fury by the hwrror of the sight.
For the pleader who prefers a voiceless picture to speak for him in place uf his u,,in
eloquence must be singularly incompetent." 2 TInE INSTITir1o OLMIU cauF Qor 'IILIAX
(with an English translation by H. E. Butler; The L4 'h Classical Lihrary 37 ct scq.
57. See ATHENATAUS, DEIPMOSOPHISTAE xiii 590.
58. ARISToTLE, RHToRizcA Bk. I, i, i.
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tunity for personal verification. Even a doctor must rest most of his
precepts of practice upon respected hearsay. This being true, principles
of reliance tend to become paramount, so that an advocate may think
it judicious to partake sparingly of the materials of formal logic.69
The science of proof is neither synonymous with the law of evidence
nor reducible to logical abstractions. One lesson we can take from logic
is to insist that sharp distinctions be drawn between facts and inferences.
In this connection it is helpful to divide facts on the one hand into those
ultimate facts proof of which is necessary to sustain a cause of action or
defense, and on the other into such subsidiary facts as constitute mere
evidence for making that proof. Such distinction agrees with Bentham's
dual breakdown into "principal facts" and "evidentiary facts.""00
Simplicity is further served by thinking of all types of evidence as
being either direct or circu*mstantial. Direct evidence involves inimediate
perception or apprehension of an ultimate fact. Circumstantial evidence
may be direct in a sense, but differs in the fundamental respect that it
involves perception or apprehension of mere evidentiary facts and so
requires one or more inferences to bring the original observation into
probative relationship with the ultimate fact which it tends to establish.
It should be clear that circumstantial evidence varies so widely in its
relevancy and probative value, that any generalization concerning its merit
is erroneous, whether it be Bentham's dictum that it is superior to direct
testimonial evidence or the more generally held opposite view that it is
inferior and less trustworthy. Lord Coleridge characterized circumnstan-
tial evidence with eloquent precision:
"I think one might describe it as a network of facts cast around
the accused man. That network may be a mere gossamer thread,
as light and as unsubstantial as the air itself. It may vanish at a
touch. It may be that, strong as it is in part, it leaves great gaps
and rents through which the accused is entitled to pass in safety.
It may be so close, so stringent, so coherent in its texture that no
efforts on the part of the accused can break through. It may come
to nothing- on the other hand, it may be absolutely convincing.
. . . The law does not demand that you shall act upon certainties
alone . . . In our lives, in our acts, in our thoughts we do not
deal with certainties; we ought to act upon just and reasonable
convictions founded upon just and reasonable grounds." 0'
Let us consider two examples:
(a) A is standing outside a house when he sees X emerge there-
from at full speed with hair dishevelled, clothes disarranged, fear
59. See JEvoNs, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC (1883). The lawyer will find in Wigmore's
collections of flesh and blood cases highly valuable illustrations of abtract principles.
WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937).
60. See BENTHAM. t, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827) 18.
61. Quoted in RIDDELL, SoME THINGS THAT MATTER (1922) 123.
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delineated on his countenance and shrieking for help, hotly pursued
by Y, who is brandishing a butcher knife. Y has a malidious and
angry look upon his face. A's visual perception of this episode is
immediate or direct evidence that X is fleeing from the house to
escape Y's assault with a deadly weapon.
(b) A is standing on the corner and sees X emerge in like manner,
but not followed by Y. Such incident is circumstantial evidence
that he is fleeing some danger within the house. It is here, how-
ever, that we observe the crucial distinction and dangerous differ-
ences between immediate and circumstantial evidence. The action
of X is consistent with other causes than an attack by Y. It may be
that X is an insane person who has hallucinations of attack and is
fleeing from an imaginary assailant.
2
The capacity of circumstantial evidence to raise ambiguous or even
contradictory inferences creates problems of elimination similar to those
which confront the physician when an ill patient exhibits certain signs
and complains of certain symptoms. As a rule, such sets of signs and
symptoms point to several alternative possibilities rather than to a single
disease to the exclusion of all others. To arrive at the diagnosis scien-
tifically, the physician must do a differential diagnosis which involves
ruling out the possibilities, one by one, by proper means of investigation,
until a single conceivable disease remains implicated as the true cause.
Similarly, failure to apply proper methods of curroburation and elimina-
tion to the alternative inferences raised by particular circumstantial
evidence may result in serious miscarriages of justice.
These considerations lead to the necessity for discrimination and
corroboration. The principle of discrimination requires that one contrive
to use such portions of several available species or items of evidence
62. If one presses the matter with the zeal of a true skeptic, it is possible to argue
that even simple perception is not self-declaratory truth but a complex conclusion based
on concealed inferences. By way of illustration, Hans Gross gives an amusing example
of how a thorough skeptic would need reason to make certain that a glass on the table
is real and not imaginary. "When fur instance I say, 'There is a glass: I , ould appear
to report a very simple sense-perceptiOn. But let us look at it a little closer. To express
myself exactly I should have to say something like this: 'As I have never lmown myself
to be the victim of hallucinations; as I have not been,, so far as I know, in bad health;
as further I have no reason to suppose that anyone has been trying to deceive me by
an optical illusion by means of mirrors or sume phyical trick; as besides I have no
ground for surmising that there is upon the table a picture --o artistic as to make a
painted glass appear a real glass; as finally I cannot imagine that the people of this
house have their table glass of rock crystal; I feel entitled to state that vwhat I saw on
the table was an ordinary glass.
"'Of course it is not suggested that one should go so far and give such a complete
series of reasoning every time that a deposition is taken down; everyone knows %%,hat
is intended by the words 'I have seen a glass.' But everyone ought to know also that
such an affirmation contains reasoning, and reasoning the correctness of which must tz
frequently examined." GRoss, op. cit. supra note 16, at 39-40.
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as are best calculated to foreclose doubt and establish conviction. The
inquiries and criteria which govern the comparative value of evidence
spring from the science of proof making rather than from rules of
evidence. Among the considerations pertinent to this evaluation of evi-
dence in terms of its probative value are these:
(1) Does the witness have or lack an interest in the outcome of the
litigation or any motive for distortion? Testimony against interest tends
to be even stronger and more convincing than mere disinterested testi-
mony.
(2) What opportunity did the witness have for observation?
(3) Did the witness have proper facilities and capacities for observa-
tion ?
(4) Were any records of the original observations made to vouchsafe
initial accuracy and subsequent recollection?
(5) Is the proposed mode of proof superior or inferior in point of
reliability and percentage of error to an alternative source of evidence?
(6) One should prefer evidence whose inferences or conclusions lend
themselves to objective modes of jury demonstration. The terminal
purpose here is to enable the trier of fact to substitute reliance upon his
own senses, so far as possible, for assertions or opinions of the witness.
(7) One should prefer evidence which leads to the desired conclusion
by means of the smallest number of intermediate inferences. As the
chain of inference lengthens, the certainty of sequence tends to diminish
and the strain on credulity and understanding increases.
(8) One should prefer evidence which gives rise to a maximum of
positive inferences with a minimum of negative or ambiguous inferences.
This reduces the burden of collateral explanation.
(9) One should prefer all forms of evidence which involve sensory
appeal. Tangible proof and jury demonstration are neglected means of
exciting the interest of the trier of fact, holding his attention and pro-
ducing conviction.
(10) One should prefer proof which fits in with the experience of the
trier of fact over that which calls for belief in evidence foreign to his
past conditioning.
(11) One should resort to diversification of evidence among as many
as possible of the six named components of proof. We might call this
approach to proof maximal use of multiple appeal as contrasted with
less versatile or unitarian methods.
(12) One should stress maximal use of confirmatory evidence with
special accent upon corroboration at all possible tangents rather than
corroboration by mere cumulation of evidence.
It is not practicable now to elaborate the several 'principles here pro-
posed as touchstones for valuing evidence and selecting among alternative
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proofs, but limited comment may be in order. Proof by jury demon-
stration is a neglected art. We have alluded previously to the "sensory
appeal" of objective evidence. This arises in part from its capacity to
arouse interest and hold attention. It depends also on satisfaction reac-
tions felt by the trier of fact when he is able to rest in larger measure
upon the testimony of his own senses. Secretly each of us is from
Missouri and prefers to be shown. Shakespeare cautioned: "Let every
eye negotiate for itself and trust no agent." Reliance upon the frail
human qualities of perception, observation, recognition, discrimination
and memory are lessened and the trier of fact is brought into close
proximity with the ultimate issue through the medium of his own visual
and auditory senses. The long chain of inference and opinion is shortened.
Let us suppose that ind proving disability under a life insurance policy,
X, attorney for the plaintiff, seeks to show that his client, Y, is no
malingerer but is suffering from enlargement of the heart caused by
advanced cardiac disease. X might avail himself of several choices in
proving that Y's heart actually is enlarged.
(1) He might offer Dr. A to testify that when he listened to Y's
heart with a stethoscope he heard a murmur which settled the diagnosis
to his satisfaction and bespoke advanced progression of heart disease.
Dr. B for the defendant might testify that he listened and heard no
such murmur.
(2) X might offer Dr. C to testify that he percussed out the topogra-
phy of the heart and found it grossly enlarged.1 The defendant might
offer Dr. D to testify that he percussed the heart and found only minimal
enlargement.
(3) X might offer through Dr. E an electrocardiogram of Y's heart.
This is an electrical tracing of the cardiac cycle made possible by action
currents accompanying the cardiac impulses which arise near the base
and extend toward the apex of the heart exciting contraction of the
muscle bundles and thus producing the heart beat. Enlargement of the
heart may cause a shift of the electrical axis and a resultant distortion
of the electrocardiograph (EKG) tracing. Suppose, however, Dr. F,
being called by defendant, says lie cannot agree to the interpretation and
considers the curves normal. The tracings are so complicated that a
lay trier of fact cannot make a safe interpretation for himself 0even with
visual access to the evidence and still must rely on one opinion or the
other.
63. "Percussion" refers to the clinical method originated by the' Viennese physician,
Auenbruegger, in 1762, whereby one places one finger on the test area and strikes it
briskly with another finger. Cavities or air-filled lungs yield a resonant note, while
fluids and solids give a duller sound. On this basis one may map out the contours of the
heart with a degree of accuracy dependent largely uporl his own skill.
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(4) Lastly, attorney X might offer an X-ray picture of the heart.
It is an axiom of medicine and roentgenology that when the width of
the heart exceeds one half the intrathoracic diameter, normal limits have
been passed and the heart is pathologically enlarged. This is al accepted
criterion which leaves little or no room for disagreement. The lay trier
of fact can see plainly the cardiac contours on the so-called five foot
film of the heart and he can use a ruler to measure the heart width as
well as the distance from one side of the rib cage to the other. Reliance
shifts from the relater of fact to the percipient juror, conflicts of opinion
are forestalled, and the evidence of heart enlargement approaches proof
positive. The evidence does not give rise to negative or ambiguotI in-
ferences. It tenders visual corroboration in lieu of verbal opinion. Similar
possibilities of selection are apt to exist in all 'types of cases and in
respect to the most diverse issues and the making of these choices repre-
sents the essence of logical proof making.
Logical problems are involved in such questions as competency of
witnesses, relevancy of testimony, probative value of particular evilence,
and perhaps even the credibility of witnesses. The relation of a given
effect to its possible causes will always pose problems in logic, This
does not imply that the rules of formal logic can compete with experience
in supplying the significant logical criteria for the solution of these prob-
lems.64 Scientific tests to determine the percentage of error implicit in
particular types of proof yield criteria which are more trustworthy than
intuitive opinion. Thus, by virtue of thousands of tests, Larson is able
to say that the so-called lie detect6r in its present form and under ideal
conditions is reliable in 90% of cases."
The law has not been entirely willing to risk the logical facilties of
jurors and so has surrounded many of these problems with rules which
we might call pronouncements of judicial logic. Insofar as there is
still material left for logical resolution by jurors, we must be honest
enough to recognize that triers of fact do not reason from formal
premises but -from a plexus of personal experience. This accounts for
the fact that jurors often reject scientific evidence and elect to believe
a contrary version founded upon lay testimony which strikes nearer
home. This truth the Roman law recognized in arranging that praetors
64. Justice Holmes: "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been cxpec
rience." TnE Co.IMox LAW (1881) 1. How much more true is this declaration when
applied to problems of proof.
65. It may be argued that these scientific tests themselves depend upon logic. li
science we shift between inductive and deductive forms of reasoning without compunc-
tion. The method of experimental verification depends more on isolating a problem,
setting up controls to rule out variants, and then seeing whether test results can be
reproduced by independent investigators using the same technique. Our conclusions rest
upon harmonious experience and only very partially on abstractions of logic.
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should decide the legal issue first and then delegate to judges the function
of determining facts in an informal way curtailed hardly at all by rules
of evidence. 6 If the trier of fact be competent and appropriate, the odds
are that he will draw upon the wealth of his own personal experience for
trustworthy criteria. He can be trusted to determine the value of evidence
as proof of the ultimate fact, though he may never consciously formulate
explicit premises as a basis of judgment.1
7
This truth rests upon the general principle that the man with sufficient
experience has already discovered the valid logic and the deceitful fallacies
of ftle subject in controversy. It is not to be doubted that the cause
of scientific proof will profit by more specific and exacting criteria of
competency and admissibility. Still, the larger and ultimate desideratum
is to fill the chairs of the triers of fact with men whose special experience
fits them to separate chaff from wheat in litigated cases without uncom-
fortable reliance upon artificial rules of logic foreign to their every day
lives.
In touching upon the "psychological" component of proof, we saw
how the testimonial activities of perception, discrimination, interpretation
and memory are open to defective exercise. In the present section we
have noticed how circumstantial evidence by raising alternative inferences
may create dangerous ambiguities. When confronted by contradictory
inferences, jurors are likely to choose that possibility which best accords
with their own personal experience and understanding. There is the
further risk that triers of fact will not appreciate the existence of all
the competing inferences or, if aware of them, will not require the proper
proof to rule out one hypothesis and rule in another. Furthermore,
circumstantial evidence derived from testimonial activities may have the
same infirmities that so often impair direct evidence. In consequence of
the fact that both species of evidence are so open to mistake, corrobora-
tion becomes the most important logical consideration either in welding
together or splitting asunder a chain of proof. In this connection the
66. The date of origin of this mechanism is not settled, but it is generally attributed
to approximately 150 B. C.
67. "Questions of evidence are continually presenting themselves to every human
being, every day, and almost every waking hour, of his life.
"Domestic management turns upon evidence. Whether the leg of mutton nvw on the
spit be roasted enough, is a question of evidence; a question of which the coo!k is
judge. The meat is done enough; the meat is not done enough: these opposite facts, the
one positive, the other negative, are the principal facts-the facts sought: evidentiary
facts, the present state of the fire, the time that has elapsed since the putting down Vf
the meat, the state of the fire at different points during that length of time, the appear-
ance of the meat, together with other points perhaps out of number, the development of
which might occupy pages upon pages, but which the cook decides upon in the cook's
way, as if by instinct; deciding upon evidence, as Monsieur Jourdan talked prose, v~ith-
out having ever heard of any such word, perhaps, in the whole course of her life." 1 BE;-
THAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EvIDENcE (1827) 18-19.
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trial lawyer will find that his position is strengthened by cumulative
testimony. That several persons witnessed the happening of an unlikely
event may bespeak a joint illusion but the normal reaction of jurors is
to regard such agreement among spectators as corroboration that the
incident did occur as related. Cumulative testimony, however, does not
have such corroborative power as confirmation through unlike or dis-
similar means. Let us suppose that we are in doubt as to whether our
feeling of warmth is due to excessive heat from without or to sonic
internal condition cauging fever. The first surmise gains ground when
we see that the wall thermometer is standing at 100' F. The more doubt-
ful or obscure the fact in issue, the more valuable is corroboration from
all possible tangents, that is to say, by evidence resting upon diverse
sources and dissimilar modes of proof. To the mathematical mind each
new approach has the tendency of further minimizing the probability of
error. In addressing oneself to the less critical minds among the twelve
jurors the rule still holds, although one must recognize that one man
may be conviniced by a species of evidence which makes little or no
impact upon the mind of another. As a corollary of this principle of
diversification, the proponent of a contention will find that by using as
many as possible of the six named components of proof, he may produce
conviction of an ultimate fact in a way which quite overpowers the
strongest cumulative testimony of his adversary. 8
IV. THE FACTUAL COMPONENT OF PROOF
Ultimate facts constitute the very atmosphere of jurisprudence for
substantive law is a flame that cannot burn in a vacuum. We might say
that all of Procedure is dedicated to providing mechanisms for doing
justice between parties in accordance with ultimate facts, that Proof
deals with the manifold activities of establishing those facts, and that
the Law of Evidence is concerned with the artificial rules thought to
determine what testimony is relevant, competent and worthy of credit.
Much of what we have said in discussing the logical component of proof
is as apropos here.
A "fact," whether it be ultimate or primary, or merely evidentiary,
acquires significance to total proof by virtue of its context. The striking
of eleven by a village clock may enable an observer to fix the time of a
burglary; or it may establish that a sick man died before his life in-
surance policy expired at midnight. The advocate is interested in con-
junctions of facts which taken together will establish or destroy a given
68. See p. 578 infra.
69. "Subjects of Jurisprudence, are, Facts and Laws: facts are the source and the
cause of laws. From facts proceed rights and wrongs; both requiring the governucnt
of lawi-to establish and enforce the one; to restrain and punish the other." RAt, A
TREATISE ON FACTS AS SuBjEcTs OF INQUIRY BY A JURY (1861) 1.
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legal issue. The addition or subtraction of a single fact may alter the
applicability of one or more doctrines of substantive law. In proof
making he must study facts as solitary entities and as collective units.
Whenever he discovers a significant fact opening up new l-gal orienta-
tions, he must suspect and search out the whole plexus of interrelated
facts. Here I must be content to touch upon certain special aspects of
the factual component of proof:
a. Bentham's Atalytical Division of Facts. Bentham sought to differ-
entiate facts according to three distinctions, namely:
"I. Distinction the first. Facts physical (having its seat in some
inanimate being) ; facts psychological (having its seat in some ani-
mate being).
II. Distinction the second. Events, and states of things. Source
of tie division in this case, the distinction between state oif motion
and a state of rest ...
The fall of a tree is an event, the existence of the tree is a state
of things: both are alike facts.
III. Distinction the third. Facts positive and negative .... In
the existence of this or that state of things, designated by a certain
denomination, we have a positive, or say, an affirmative fact: in the
non-existence of it, a negative fact .... Thus, by health, is meant
nothing more than the absence, the non-existence, of disease; by
minority, the individual's non-arrival at a certain age; by darkness,
the absence of light; and so on.'70
It is natural that Bentham should have sought to separate insensate
objects from animate beings which possess the reasoning faculty and
a capacity to be acted upon by sensory stimuli. The second distinction
between a state of motion and a state of rest is nothing more nor less
than the old function-structure dichotomy into which introspective psy-
chologists have always delighted in resolving objective reality. The third
distinction between positive and negative facts is illusory. A negative
fact is nothing more than the establishment of a contrary and contra-
dictory state of affairs either by a party or his opponent in such a way
as to displace and destroy belief in the ultimate fact which the moving
party needs to prove as a part of his case. It is more realistic to classify
a "negative fact" as contradictdry evidence since it is not a fact of
legal consequence until the jury verdict or finding of the court so estab-
lishes it.
b. Functional Vie-wpoint with Emphasis on Differentiation of Fact
and Opinion. Mlany states have now passed statutes providing that a
properly certified copy of a duly filed death certificate " . shall be
70. BENTHAM , op. cit. supra note 67, 45-50.
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prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."' 71 Litigants in insur-
ance cases have found the death certificate a convenient means to make
prima facie proof of cause of death without producing the medical
witness.72 Judicious wording of the recitals may impart the guise of fact
to rank hearsay, opinion, or sheer speculation.73 The hardship of these
cases lies in deprivation of cross-examination by defendant,74 in frequent
passing off of mere opinion and incompetent hearsay as fact unless the
defendant can discharge the difficult burden of going forward now
shifted to him to discredit the recitals, and in the fact that the certificate
is customarily made out by a partisan, the doctor usually being the
family physician who attended decedent in his last illness. It is an axiom
of proof that an expert's opinion is no better than the facts upon which
it rests, but here that guarantee may be destroyed if the certifying physi-
cian place himself beyond subpoena at the time of trial. And if defendant
calls the physician to the stand he may thereby make him his own witness.
This species of sub rosa practice of clinical forensic medicine in our
courts unfairly shifts to a defendant much of the burden of going for-
ward which should rest with the plaintiff. The primary difficulty lies
in the failure of courts to distinguish mere opinion from recitals of fact
which alone are given hearsay exemption.
In Dow v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Companvy, the bene-
ficiary under an accident policy obtained a $7,900 judgment for acci-
dental death of assured from immersion in a bathtub filled with scalding
water. The victim was found in a bathroom whose walls were wet with
condensed steam. Defendant contended that the assured must have
succumbed to pre-existing angina pectoris, a heart disease, else he could
71. See, e.g., 13 TEx. AxN. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1940) art. 4477, Rule 54a.
72. Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Duncan, 235 Ky. 613, 31 S. W. (2d) 915 (1929).
73. See Walcott v. Sumner, 308 Mass. 413, 32 N. E. (2d) 685 (1941).
74. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hembree, 240 Ky. 97, 41 S. W. (2d)
649 (1931) (reversed on ground of variance between pleading and proof).
75. 297 Mass. 34, 7 N. E. (2d) 426 (1937). Accord, Southland Life Insurance Co.
v. Brown, 121 S. W. (2d) 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (death certificate reciting "suicide"
held admissible on behalf of insurer to support defense under life insurance policy);
Abbott v. Prudential Insurance Co., 89 N. H. 149, 195 Atl. 413 (1937) ; Walcott v. Sutin-
ner, 308 Mass. 413, 32 N. E. (2d) 685 (1941) (aged tenant was found lying on lower
floor with her skull fractured. In wrongful death action against owners of building for
alleged negligence in maintaining building, it vas necessary for plaintiff to prove that
decedent was injured by a fall down the stairs. Held: In respect to medical examiner's
death certificate, which recited "Fractured Skull Fall downstairs in Boston on Sept. 23,
1935," it was error for trial court to exclude all of these words except "Fractured Skull."
The medical examiner was not present at the time of injury. All the circumstantial evi-
dence upon which the inference of a fall could be predicated was before the jury and they
found for defendant. The trial court ruled correctly on this evidence. In holding the
excluded recitals competent, the Supreme Judicial Court perpetuated the error of the Dow
case by making hearsay opinion superior to the factual evidence from which it must
have been deduced).
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not have stayed in the scalding water, whereas the beneficiary hypothe-
sized that assured must have slipped and accidentally fallen into the tub.
The death certificate relied upon contained these recitations: "Burns of
body and legs. Accident. Exposed to scalding water in bath tub." In
overruling exceptions to the sufficiency of the certificate to make out
prima facie proof of "accidental" death, the Supreme Judicial Court
said:
"By [the General Laws] . . . such a record is 'prima facie evi-
dence of the facts recorded.' The word 'accident' was properly
included in the record of facts as part of the cause and manner of
death which . . . the medical examiner was required to report to
the city clerk. Cause and manner of death in a report of this kind
are necessarily matters of opinion or judgment deduced from other
facts found rather than matters of direct observation." 13
The medical examiner could infer that the burns were due to scalding
water but the proriouncement that the death was due to accident was
a gratuitous opinion not deducible from scientific evidence.
The point intended to be made is that, even under statutes which
exempt only facts from the hearsay rule, courts fail to distinguish
opinion and tolerate second hand evidence loaded down with vices inimi-
cal to sound principles of proof making.'7 Other illustrations could be
76. Dow v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 297 Mass. 34, 37, 7 N. E. (2d)
426, 428 (1937).
77. There are several possible correctives for this specific practice:
(1) The trial court should always grant a continuance if the subpoenaed certifier
is not available to be called to the stand for cross-examination.
(2) A certificate should be held incompetent to prove cause of death when its re-
citals show that they do not rest upon personal knowledge or investigation of the cer-
tifier (hearsay upon hearsay). Heffron v. Prudential Insurance Co., 137 Pa. Super. Ct.
69, 8 A. (2d) 491 (1939).
(3) A certificate should be held incompetent to prove cause of death when its
recitals show that they rest upon the assertions of a lay person, as for instance, a non-
medical coroner. Miller v. McCarthy, 198 Minn. 497, 270 N. NV. 559 (1936).
(4) Statutes making death certificates admissible as "prima facie evidence of facts
therein stated," may be construed to include only such items as fact and date of death
and identity of decedent, and not statements as to cause, this being always a matter of
opinion. Heffron v. Prudential Insurance Co. and Miller v. McCarthy, supra.
(5) It may be held in respect to certain statutes that the statutory intent is to
arrange for recording of vital statistics and use of the information in non-contested con-
nections, but not as evidence of cause of death in litigation bet-cen private parties
where that is one of the vital issues in dispute. Re Curtiss's Will, 140 Misc. 185, 250
N. Y. Supp. 146 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
(6) The most satisfactory control is to substitute for the antiquated coroner system a
model Medical Examiner Law giving exclusive jurisdiction to forensic medicine enxperts
of investigation of cause of death in a broad category of cases including "casualty"
(similar to New York Act), death of persons not attended by a physician, and cases
where there is suspicion of foul play. Such, an act is made effectual by coupling it wiflt
a burial law requiring proper death certificate to be filed before burial permit will be
19421
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cited of failure to insist on dissection of opinion from fact with con-
sequent injury to ascertainrnent of truth.
c. Subversion of Proof by Technical Rules of Evidence. All technical
rules of evidence derive their justification from supposed efficacy in
protecting or improving the making of proof. One must notice, how-
ever, the several causes which tend to magnify the rules while their
philosophical basis becomes more dim. The multiplication of precedents,
the distance to original formulations in older cases, the urgency of law
business have all been leading for some years to an accent on administra-
tion of law precedents at the expense of critical evaluation. Tle rule is
accepted as a standard nostrum; the law dispenses the new "pink bottle"
of medicine with eventual forgetfulness of the particular disease for
which the original prescription was concocted. This process in time leads
in the field of common law evidence to an excess of non-specific remedies
poorly applied. Precepts of sound proof tell us that the most valuable
guarantee of accuracy is to prefer the best evidence of a transaction.
This in turn makes the testimony of the person best situated for cor-
rectly observing a transaction superior proof to that of one less favor-
ably situated. It also makes hearsay testimony vouchsafed by a motive
issued by health authorities. If a certificate contains recitals of medico-legal import,
no permit will be issued until the medical examiner has made an investigation and filed
an official certificate.
Even here, recitals based on non-medical or hearsay opinion, should not be receiv-
able as prima facie evidence of cause of death. The mechanisms mentioned should be
used to guarantee competent investigation. Where cause of death is contested on tile
ground that it rests on opinion, the law should require the medical examiner to be pro-
duced in order to protect the valuable privilege of cross-examination. If the suspect
opinion is actually an expert inference based upon scientific evidence rather than adopted
hearsay, the conclusion of the examiner will not suffer through forced disclosure of its
basis.
Most of the death certificate statutes intended that causes of death would be con-
fined to natural deaths by disease and certified by the. physician last in attendance on the
deceased. Thus the physician was expected to certify from personal knowledge on the
basis of ante-mortem examinations. (Heffron v. Prudential Insurance Co., suipra). Post-
mortem examination by a non-attending physician, if done by a competent examiner, is
even more reliable in determining the medical causation of death. The difficulty lies in
broadening causation to include the more remote and conjectural question of whether
the death was intended or accidental, and extraneous circumstances preceding the veri-
fiable medical cause. Here the non-attending medical examiner may be drawing infer-
ences from scientific observations or he may be adopting rumors or hearsay, and the
uncertainty of its factual basis forbids that the certificate be accepted as prima facie evi-
dence of fact until adequate exploration of the foundation on which the opinion rests.
(7) In respect to the residue of cases where recitals of a death certificate might
impute death to a medico-legal cause, as for instance some causation covered by an in-
surance policy, the insurer may protect against fraud and imposition by contract clauses
in the policy securing the right to post-mortem as wel as ante-mortem examinations.
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lindsay, 69 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
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for accuracy sometimes preferable to non-hearsay evidence. It is not
unusual to see courts ignoring the principles of proof to pay homage
to stereotyped rules of evidence even though by so doing they prefer
an inferior to a superior species of proof.
Example: In Hill v. Aetna Life Insurance Company"s assured
was killed by a train and the beneficiary sued on an accident policy
which provided for benefits of $1,000 except in event assured was
killed "entering or trying to leave a moving conveyance using steamn
as motive power" in which event only $200 should he payable.
Defendant contended that assured received his fatal injuries as tile
result of trying to leave a railroad car while the train was in motion.
(1) To this end defendant offered a witness who sav the train
pass, glimpsed the deceased man struggling and falling alongside the
train, ran to him, rolled him over and obtained his story. The court
held that the trial judge properly excluded the statement of deceased
as to how he had sustained his injury, because the conversation was
not a part of the res gestae, being narrative rather than exclamatory,
and so incompetent hearsay.
(2) The deceased later had told plaintiff, the beneficiary, the facts
of the accident but this testimony, too, was held properly excluded
as hearsay.
(3) A brother of the deceased man, on the basis of still more cir-
cuitous hearsay, made out an affidavit attached by the plaintiff to
the proof of loss and stating that "just after the train started John
Hill stepped from the train and was caught by his overalls and
thrown under the car wheels." The Supreme Court held that this
evidence of the cause of death was admissible, though hearsay,
because a part of the proof of loss.
Thus we have the spectacle of a court shutting out the best evidence
volunteered by a witness present at the scene of the accident, while
admitting circuitous hearsay probably derived from the same source by
others not on hand at the time of the injury.
Let us consider, also, the case of patient X who enters hospital .A
for diagnosis and treatment and in his past history gives a vague account
of procedures applied five years earlier at hospital B in a neighboring
town. The examining physician in .4 will write to B for a report.
Several physicians at B may have treated X and various entries on hos-
pital charts have been transferred to a permanent book, but the super-
intendent of B merely sends forward his owti abbreviated summary.
This is hearsay but it is better evidence to guide diagnosis and treatment
than the first hand account given by the patient because originally it
rested on more expert knowledge, it was preserved against failure of
recollection, and hospital B has no motive for distortion. Indeed, it has
78. 150 N. C. 1, 63 S. E. 124 (1903).
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every desire to report correctly in order to do its bit in keeping up
the accuracy of exchanged information. Thus the source of evidence
and its personality are more important than the dress it wears. Even
if the courts refuse to agree, the advocate must still give it superior
credit, when judging the merits of a case for himself in the course of
pre-trial investigation.
d. Study of Evidence li Terms of the Ultimate Fact to be Proved.
The science of'proof could probably be advanced by studying the factual
component more astutely-as regards alternative types of evidence admis-
sible to prove a given ultimate fact.7 9 Sources of proof are often over-
looked in preparation ,of cases because the lawyer is unaware that certain
facts are relevant or-is unacquainted with dissimilar methods of proving
the same fact. It is not necessary that every conceivable ultimate fact
be explored in terms of every relevant, evidentiary fact which could be
pressed into service in litigation. This would entail unending volumes
and much desultory study. However, certain crucial and frequently re-
curring, facts upon which multiple legal consequences depend, could be
explored in'an affirmative way in teaching proof as a positive science.
N ot only is there wanting among law school graduates a proper knowl-
edge of all the alternative paths and mechanisms of proof, but seasoned
lawyers often come to unmerited defeat because of inadequate grasp of
the severaI species of evidence and varieties of witnesses one might use
to prove or disprove the crucial issue.
V. THE LEGAL COMPONENT OF PROOF
One cannot ignore the fact that proof making is conditioned by the
philosophy of jurisprudence, the mechanisms of trial, and the rules of
substantive and procedural law current at a given time. We may dis-
tinguish three general orders.
a. Early Common Law and Justice by Combat. Ve must recall that as
late as 1818 Judge Ellenborough held, in the case of Ashford v. Thorn-
ton so, 'that no change had been made warranting departure from the
ancient common law rule in murder trials that "the mode of trial by
law in such a case 'of appeal is by 'battle', at the election of the appellee
except where the appellee is an infant or a woman or above sixty years
19. So far as I know one of the earliest efforts in this general direction was
RAx, TREATISE ON FACtS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY nv A JUtVv (1861). See also 'MooE,
A TREATISE, ox FACTs OR THE WEIGHT AN1) VALUE OF EVIDENCE (1908) ; AinoTr, FACts
(5th ed.,by P. W. Viesselman, 1937) ; NICHOLS, APPLIED EVIDENCE (1928, Supp, 1934).
80. KBarn: &Ald. 405 (1818). This decision occasioned a sensation and resulted
itv thesttt" 4f 59 GEo. III, c. 46 (1819), which abolished criminal appeals and trials
by battle in writs of right.
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of age." In trial by battle we see the primitive concept of letting the
best man win by "might and main," using all the strength and means
at his command short of actual foul play. This combat aspect of liti-
gation has psychological connotations running deeper than self vindica-
tion of one's cause by valor or might. It expresses the animosity factor
in litigation, the desire to be at one's assailant and "have it out." Later
we see the more primitive arrangement giving way to combat by proxy
in the form of bilateral litigation. Each party still fends for himself
under rules of diligence but aided by a lawyer as his paid champion.
The law suit here still retains a dual character, on the one hand being
a means of settling disputes with approximate justice, and on the other
a sublimation mechanism for combat feelings and expression of grudges.
The court room is a genteel battle ground and party strategy is not taboo.
It is a litigant's own fault if lie brings to his cause a legal champion
wanting in skill or knowledge. Collateral proof making flourishes along-
side more exact modes of proof, and accent is placed on elaboration of
exclusionary rules of evidence because of inexpertness of lay jurors.
This order of things, largely still current, is beautifully described by
Judge Hutcheson's holding in Maryland Casualty Company T. Reid"l
that a certain argument of plaintiff's attorney was not sufficiently preju-
dicial to require a reversal:
a trial is no cool process of mere science. It is not, it
cannot be, rigidly formal, coldly lugical. In a trial proof is but the
means to an end. That end, not the stirring of a mild and passive
sympathy in the minds of the triers with the litigant's point of view,
but the inducing there of the impulse to blieve, the will to say 'for
the plaintiff,' or 'for the defendant'. All preparation for judicial
proof looks toward, and all such proof is finally presented in a trial,
an action in form, dramatic in every case, in fact, overvhelmingly
so in many of them. The very nature of a jury trial makes this so.
Here men deal in dramatic fashion with the human equation in the
most illusive forms. Here men strive for the mastery, not over
each other, but over the minds of the triers, to induce there the will
to believe, and to declare. Mlinds which are induced to and do reach
their conclusions in the atmosphere of drama, and often under the
pressure of emotional stress, by the loose and ordinary methods of
persuasion and influence common to the street..
"It is of the essential nature of a jury trial, then, that though its
purpose is the same as that of a scientific investigation, to fully pre-
sent the gathered facts which will furnish the grounds for correct
induction, these gathered facts are presented for decision in a dra-
matic setting, are introduced in a dramatic way, and the trial itself
must come to a dramatic end in a soleni and fateful pronouncement.
81. 76 F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
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For a common law jury trial is at last a trial, with its attack and
its defense, its action and its suspense, and not a scientific inquiry,
which in a leisurely and impersonal way may continue indefinitely
until the quest is at an end .... 82
b. Shift from Justice by Combat to Justice by Administration. Under
this order of things, accent shifts from litigation by strategy to mechan-
isms of procedure and proof better designed to get at the true facts
of dispute.83 Though bilateral disputation tends to perpetuate the adver-
sary characteristics of combat, there is new emphasis on economy of
pleadings, pre-trial discovery, arbitration and compromise, and revision
of rules of procedure.8 4 Roscoe Pound, in Ulrich v. McConaughcy,
characterized this shifting emphasis as. follows:
"The common law originally was very strict in confining each
party to his own means of proof, and, as it has been expressed,
regarded a trial as a cock-fight, wherein he won whose advocate
was the gamest bird with the longest spurs. But we have come to
take a more liberal view and have done away with most of those
features of trials which gave rise to that reproach."' 5
c. Ascertainment of Ultimate Facts by Scientific Modes of Proof. The
natural continuation of the foregoing trend in law would seem to be
toward careful reappraisal and replacement of many of the elaborate
exclusionary rules of evidence by more expert mechanisms of proof. We
see a visible shift in this direction in relaxation or abolition of strict
rules of evidence in proceedings before administrative bodies and Work-
men's Compensation Commissions. Dissatisfaction with existing mecli-
anisms of proof does not guarantee improvement. By the very act of
liberalizing standards of admissibility we commit ourselves to methods
for improving the discrimination of the trier of fact in dealing with
the enlarged evidentiary material. Only by supporting the innovation
by appropriate modes of procedure and trial can we broaden the range
of admissibility while preserving and increasing guarantees that relevant,
probative and trustworthy evidence will be applied properly in the process
of proof making. 
8
82. Id. at 32.
83. For a valuable summary and appraisal of procedure mechauisms, see Simpson,
A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem (1939) 53 HARV. L. Rnv. 169.
84. Witness the new Federal Rules and the nation-wide movement toward thorough
revision of rules of procedure in state courts.
85. 63 Neb. 10, 20, 88 N. W. 150, 154 (1901).
86. One also encounters the legal component in deciding which of several alterna-
tive legal modes or mechanisms of proof making he will use. Strategic considerations
dictate these selections, but the subject is substantial. The writer feels it is wise to reserve
it for a future paper dealing with the legal mechanics of proof making.
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VI. THE SCIENTIFIC COMPONENT OF PROOF
Scientific proof varies in its decisiveness according to whether it rests
upon opinion regarding a controversial subject or upon some irrefutable
demonstration of fact. But all evidence worthy of being called scientific,
wherever it falls along the range of reliability, has qualities calculated
to make it more trustworthy than other types. It usually satisfies the
preferential requirements mentioned as logical criteria. It is largely free
of the defects of perception, discrimination, imagination and recollection
which impair most verbal testimony. Ideally it substitutes standard tech-
niques and controlled conditions for haphazard impressions. It employs
procedures enabling independent corroboration by other impartial experts.
Its results are difficult to refute by any species of direct contradiction.
Thus in the trial of Ruth Snyder and Judd Gray for the murder of
Albert Snyder, offhand it might have seemed fanciful to suppose that
Gray, a small man, could have tied Snyder, a large athletic man, to
a bed with window sash preliminary to fracturing his skull with a window
weight. Dr. Gettler, the eminent toxicologist, was able to account for
the seeming improbability by his post-morten analysis of Snyder's brain
showing that the victim was first intoxicated and then chloroformed.
The defense could not counter this proof.
It is usually true that scientific proof excludes a maximum of an-
biguous inferences and narrows the probability of error much more
sharply than ordinary evidence. It has the peculiar virtue of detachment
provided the investigation is made by an impartial expert with no interest
in producing a particular verdict. It generally has the strategic quality
of surprise testimony and lessens the scope of counter theory. By this
very attribute it curtails invention of explanation in cases involving
questions of fraud or criminal complicity. Its high degree of accuracy
makes it relevant and trustworthy and advances the doing of justice in
the settling of disputes.
It is often ideally suited to jury demonstration, a neglected but power-
ful mode of producing conviction. In questioned document cases, for
example, the several badges of forgery, such as pen lifts, meticulous
copying so different from the free flow of spontaneous handwriting,
variations in formation of characteristic letters, differences in slant,
height of writing, and pen pressure all become visually eloquent by mak-
ing photographic enlargements of the scrutinized signature for com-
parison with genuine standards. Because of the several superiorities of
scientific proof, the advocate will do well to make all possible use of it,
and the law will serve justice by fostering various mechanisms for its
more perfect utilization.
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VII. DIVERSIFIED USE OF THE COMPONENTS OF PROOF
AS A MEANS OF CORROBORATING EVIDENCE AND
PRODUCING CONVICTION
Each component of proof has some special and peculiar bearing on
persuasion. Different triers of fact react more to one component than
another. Employment of diverse approaches to prove the existence of
an ultimate fact introduces a powerful factor of cross-fire corroboration
which eliminates lingering doubts. Proof from every possible tangent
has more force than mere cumulative evidence, for this latter proceeds
along a single road and leaves other pathways of approach untravelled
and open for invasion of skepticism and doubt. One must emphasize
all inferences which tend to produce the desired conviction and negative
those which lead to contrary conclusions. In the complex function of
trying law suits, one must first be satisfied of the merit of his cause,
and then marshall and make proof with due regard to simultaneous use
of all six components.
Example: In a f6rged document case the proponent offered thirty-
five witnesses who swore that they had long known the signature of
the testatrix and could identify it as genuine. This is what we might
call cumulative testimony carried to the "nth" degree. Contestant used
an entirely different mode of corroboration of non-execution of the will
which called for using only seven witnesses. These, however, were spread
over the several components (preconceptual, psychological, logical, fac-
tual, legal and scientific) with more acumen, as follows:
(1) Preconceptions: The will, if genuine, would disinherit an only
son, and this is contrary to the average juror's philosophy as to
paternal obligations and tends to stamp the will as an unnatural dis-
position.
(2) Psychological: The testatrix had practically reared contestant's
two sons; if the will were genuine, it made no provision for them,
which seemed unlike testatrix psychologically.
(3) Logical: The purported inducement for the execution of the
will offered for probate was simultaneous execution by proponent,
second husband of testatrix, of a mutual will of like terms in which
he provided that should he die first, all of his property should go
to testatrix. In turn the alleged will made by testatrix, and attacked
as a forgery, provided that in event she should die before her second
husband, the proponent, all the rest and residue of her property
should go to him. To prove that mutual benefits in making alleged
mutual wills could not have been a material motive, contestant
showed that testatrix was a very wealthy woman in her own right,
but that her second husband was practically penniless, so she could
have received no benefit from this arrangement.
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(4) Factual: Proponent relied upon opinions of lay witnesses that
the signature was that of testatrix. Contestant showed that in
signatures admittedly signed by proponent, the letters "er" were
written with the same slant and style. These facts were stressed as
the foundation for an inference and opinion that proponent forged
his wife's signature.
(5) Legal: Contestant frustrated efforts of proponent's thirty-five
witnesses to harmonize their evidence by invoking the rule that each
witness had to wait outside the court room until called to the stand.
(6) Scientific: In addition to lay testimony denying authenticity of
the signature, contestant offered a noted handwriting expert who
demonstrated to the jury by photographic enlargements a number
of pen lifts in the signature under scrutiny. There were other indicia
of forgery which could be shown to the jury visually.
Proponent did not diversify his proof among the six components,
offered no scientific testimony of authenticity, and relied on mere cwnu-
lative corroboration rather than on what we may call corroboration at
all possible tangents. Although the thirty-five witnesses offered by pro-
ponent numbered among them two sisters of the dead woman, a lav.'yer
who drew the will and a second lawyer who swore he signed it as a
witness, the proof of contestant was so convincing that within an hour
after retirement, the jury returned a verdict of forgery.
VIII. CONCLUSION
All may not agree that the problen of proof should be so broadly
formulated and many would confine it strictly to the competency, rele-
vancy and materiality of particular evidence or modes of proof to estab-
lish the existence of ultimate facts directly or inferentially. Whether
one views the problem narrowly as a logician might be inclined to do,
or broadly as perforce a trial lawyer must, the primacy of the problem
of proof over mere technical rules of evidence can hardly be questioned.
Wigrnore himself has proclaimed this in his intriguing book, The Science
of Judicial Proof,"7 and MIcCormick, another authority on the Law
of Evidence, has expressed similar sentiments.8" ,Morgan and Maguire
87. ". . . this process of Proof represents the objective in every judicial investi-
gation. The procedural rules for admissibility are merely a preliminary aid to tle
main activity, vie. the persuasion of the tribunal's mind to a correct conclusion by Eafe
materials. .... And, for another thing, the judicial rules of admissibility are destined
to lessen in relative importance during the next perod of development. Proof ,ill
assume the important place; and we must therefore prepare ourselves for this shifting
of emphasis." WIGM RE, THE SCIENCE OF JUtDICLL PROOF (3d ed. 1937) 4.
88. "A competent manipulation of the armory of rules which the mudern law, of
evidence furnishes would require that cases be tried by specialists who did nuthing else.
The game would be at least as difficult as the new five-suited bridge. But in fact, the
trial lawyer knows that the game as it is played is not bridge at all, but poker, and
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have expressed critical dissatisfaction with the rules of evidence in terms
of utility, 9 and Davis recently showed how poorly they fit fact finding
activities involved in administrative law.9
I have sought to stress the neglected importance of the functional
approach to proof and the fallacy here of thinking in legal "compart-
ments" or on a single plane. Proof making is a two sided coin: on
one side is all that has to do with witnesses and sources of evidence;
on the other is all that affects the trier of facts. Formulation of the legal
position and marshalling of proof can be practiced as a science. In mak-
ing proof and inducing conviction, one can proceed scientifically in em-
ploying selective methods and in making diversified use of the several
components, but here science passes into art. Like the physician we
may diagnose scientifically but somewhere in treatment we may have to
apply art to bring the case to a successful conclusion.
In breaking proof down into such factors as preconceptions, and psy-
chological, logical, factual, legal and scientific ingredients, I do not main-
tain that these several components are of like quality or kind. They
cannot always be homologized, for some represent structural units and
some functional mechanisms or modes of approach. Sometimes they
involve legal and sometimes extra-legal materials and many defy pre-
cision methods in their analysis and application. Yet diverse and hetero-
geneous as they are, each is an essential part of the intricate mosaic of
the proof making process in actions at law.
No one can logically maintain that proof making is entirely scientific.
Still it is true, I think, that the trial lawyer must practice proof making
according to some plan and sequence. This calls for employing the several
components of proof in a proper manner according to a functional
approach based on strategic selection among alternatives open at each
that a good stack of chips in the form of adequate preparation of the facts and sub-
stantive law, a stout heart, a shrewd knowledge of human nature, and a fair run of
cards, are all he needs.
"In actual jury trials the machinery of evidence rules, devised to filter the testi-
mony for the untrained minds of the jurymen, has become too complex for use except
to the limited extent indicated above." McCoRMIcK, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence
(address before the Dallas Bar, June 11, 1938) in Tn DALLAS BAt SPEAKS (1938)
117, 119.
89. ". . . there is scarcely a segment of the subject which does not call for re-
examination and revision. What is needed is a well-designed and well-constructed code
built upon the two leading principles, enunciated by Thayer more than forty years ago
'(1) that nothing is to be received which is not logically probative of some matter
requiring to be proved; and (2) that everything which is thus probative should come
in, unless a clear ground of policy or law excludes it.'" Morgan and Maguire, Lookili,
Backward and Forward at Evidencc (1937) 50 HAiv. L. Rav. 909, 922-23.
90. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrativc Process
(1942) 55 -ARv. L. REv. 364.
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step of the judicial process. It will be observed that the components of
proof have been specified in a certain order, namely: preconceptual, py-
chological, logical, factual, legal and scientific. I have placed the first two
terms on the left as indicating values likely to be unspecified, collateral
and sometimes prejudicial to the science of accurate proof making tho ugh
always pertinent to the art of persuasion. As reforms may he made,
greater accent and reliance must be placed on components toward the
right end. Here we come into the realm of ideal criteria and mechanis-nis,
look more closely to probative value, and encounter the several specieS
of scientific proof. In the quest of law for truth we may hope and
expect that these "right end" components of proof will early attain their
fitting place of pre-eminence.
